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INTRODUCTION 
Fifteen years ago, Justice William Brennan wrote an article in 
which he called upon state courts to "step into the breach" left by 
what Brennan perceived to be the U.S. Supreme Court's retreat from 
its commitment to the protection of individual rights. 1 Brennan urged 
state supreme courts to seize control of the protection of constitutional 
rights by looking to state constitutions as potentially more generous 
guarantors of individual rights than the U.S. Constitution as construed 
by the Burger Court. Brennan's article, which has been called the 
"Magna Carta" of state constitutionalism, 2 earned him the sobriquet 
of "patron saint" of sta~e constitutional law3 and gave birth to a move-
ment advocating state independence in constitutional decisionmaking. 
Adherents of this "New Federalism" movement,4 who include among 
their number several distinguished state jurists5 and some prolific aca-
I. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REv. 489, 503 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, State Constitutions]; see also William J, 
Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of 
Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, Bill of Rights]. 
2. Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 
RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716 (1983). 
3. Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet - Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional 
Law, 15 HASTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. 429, 429 (1988). 
4. The movement has also been called the "New Judicial Federalism" to distinguish it from a 
legislative program pushed during the Reagan Administration that was also called "New Feder-
alism." The Reagan Administration program involved making changes in federal law designed 
to reallocate governmental responsibilities from the federal to state governments. The New Fed-
eralism under discussion here is a state-initiated movement to achieve judicial rather than legisla-
tive independence from the federal government, and on a constitutional rather than 
programmatic level. 
S. Former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice 
Shirley Abrahamson, New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Stewart Pollock, New York Court of 
Appeals Judge Judith Kaye, and Washington Supreme Court Justice Robert Utter have been 
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demics, 6 have produced a voluminous body of commentary studying 
the decisions of state supreme courts, and exhorting them to greater 
decisional independence.7 Judging from this literature, the advocates 
of New Federalism are extraordinarily optimistic about the prospects 
for state constitutional law achieving the independence and promi-
nence necessary not only to meet Justice Brennan's challenge, but to 
fulfi11 what they regard as the promise of a genuinely federal system of 
government. 8 
The recent retirement of Justices Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, 
the last two liberals on the U.S. Supreme Court,9 and the correspond-
ing solidification during the 1990-1991 Term of the Court's conserva-
tive majority, make this an appropriate time to reconsider the 
potential role of state constitutional law in American society. Are 
state courts, as proponents of New Federalism contend, developing an 
independent body of constitutional jurisprudence? If so, will state 
courts assume the dominant role traditionally occupied by the 
Supreme Court in articulating and protecting individual rights? If 
not, can they assume such a role, and should they? 
In this article, I approach these questions in two steps. First, I 
examine the status of state constitutional law as it is practiced today. I 
conclude that, contrary to the claims of New Federalism, state consti-
tutional law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and 
essentially unintelligible pronouncements. I argue that the fundamen-
tal defect responsible for this state of affairs is the failure of state 
among the most active contributors to the New Federalism literature. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abra-
hamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 
TEXAS L. REV. 1141 (1985); Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 399 (1987); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State 
Courts, 18 GA. L. R.Ev. 165 (1984); Pollock, supra note 2; Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional 
Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in 
the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. R.Ev. 19 (1989). 
6. Ronald K.L. Collins, Robert F. Williams, and Donald E. Wilkes, Jr. have been among the 
more active expounders of New Federalism. Representative examples of their work include Ron-
ald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions - The Montana Disaster, 63 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 
1095 (1985); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of Rights, 
54 MISS. L.J. 223 (1984); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of 
State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. R.Ev. 353 (1984). 
7. For comprehensive bibliographies of the literature, both old and new, dealing with state 
constitutional law, see DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317-35 (Bradley D. 
McGraw ed., 1985); TIM J. WATTS, STATE CONSfITUTIONAL LAW DEVELOPMENT: A BIBLI-
OGRAPHY (1991); Earl M. Maltz et al., Selected Bibliography on State Constitutional Law, 20 
RUTGERS L.J. 1093 (1989). 
8. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
9. Justice Blackmun is today often considered a liberal. This shows how times have changed. 
During his early years on the Court he was considered a centrist, if not a conservative. See Philip 
B. Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 265, 
268. 
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courts to develop a coherent discourse of state constitutional law -
that is, a language in which it is possible for participants in the legal 
system to make intelligible claims about the meaning of state 
constitutions. 
Second, I analyze the reasons for the failure of state courts to de-
velop such a discourse. After rejecting several frequently offered ex-
planations, I conclude that the failure of state constitutional discourse 
reflects a much deeper failure, a· failure of state constitutionalism itself. 
The central premise of state constitutionalism is that a state constitu-
tion reflects the fundamental values, and ultimately the character, of 
the people of the state that adopted it. This premise, however, cannot 
serve as the foundation for a workable state constitutional discourse 
because it is not a good description of actual state constitutions; it 
embraces theoretical inconsistencies that undermine its value as a 
framework for a coherent discourse; and it takes an obsolete and po-
tentially dangerous view of the texture and focus of American national 
identity. 
Before turning to the analysis itself, I want to convey a better sense 
of the problem I will be addressing by relating a story of sorts about 
state constitutional law. It is a story that I believe describes the expe-
rience of a great many lawyers in this country. 
Imagine that you are researching potential challenges that your cli-
ent could make to a state law. You research federal constitutional law 
and find that you have a potential argument under, let us say, the 
Equal Protection Clause. But you soon find that the standard applied 
by the federal courts - suppose rational basis review applies - is so 
deferential that your federal claim is a guaranteed loser. Good lawyer 
that you are, though, you recall that your state constitution also con-
tains an equal protection clause. Perhaps, you think to yourself, the 
state constitution offers more favorable possibilities for your client. 
You now begin to research state constitutional law. What do you 
find? One distinct possibility is that the state courts have held that the 
state provision means exactly the same thing as the federal provision, 
and that whatever analysis the federal courts use under the federal 
Constitution is the analysis that should be used under the state consti-
tution as well. 10 This result is unsatisfying, but at least it ends your 
research. After confirming your conclusion, you abandon further state 
constitutional research as unproductive - it adds nothing to your 
case. If you mention the state constitution at all, it might be a pro 
10. See infra notes 99-129 and accompanying text. 
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forma citation just to remind the court of the dual nature of your 
claim. 
Now suppose you are luckier, and find that the state provision 
either has never been construed, 11 or that the state supreme court has 
held that the meaning of the state constitutional provision is not de-
pendent on the meaning of the federal one. Perhaps you even find a 
handful of cases in which the state courts have rejected the analogous 
federal analyses and have reached results different from those that fed-
eral courts would reach.12 Your heart is filled with hope. Although 
you will not find your argument handed to you on a silver platter, you 
at least have an opening, it seems, to craft an argument that the state 
constitutional provision has a meaning more favorable to your client 
than its federal counterpart. 
You now get down to serious work. After all, you know how to 
"do" constitutional law. You will comb the state decisions to unearth 
the relevant history of the provision at issue. You will figure out 
which framers of the state constitution the state supreme court consid-
ers influential, and you will discover useful tidbits concerning their 
constitutional philosophy. You will ferret out from state supreme 
court decisions broad language about the history, purpose, structure, 
and political theory of the state constitution. You will then weave 
these materials together into a coherent and convincing story about 
the state constitution, perhaps contrasting it with the familiar stories 
of the federal Constitution. This story will form the basis for your 
state constitutional claim on behalf of your client. 
When you undertake this research, here is what you are likely to 
find. After reading dozens of state constitutional decisions, you have 
absolutely no sense of the history of the state constitution. You do not 
know the identity of the founders, their purposes in creating the con-
stitution, or the specific events that may have shaped their thinking. 
You find nothing in the decisions indicating how the various provi-
sions of the document fit together into a coherent whole, and if you do 
find anything at all it is a handful of quotations from federal cases 
discussing the federal Constitution. You are able to form no concep-
tion of the character or fundamental values of the people of the state, 
and no idea how to mount an argument that certain things are more 
important to the people than others. If you have found state court 
decisions ·departing from the federal approach to the corresponding 
federal provision, you have no idea why the courts departed from fed-
11. State constitutions are often less thoroughly elaborated than the federal Constitution. 
See infra note 69. 
12. See infra notes 141-61 and accompanying text. 
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eral reasoning; at best, you are left with the vague impression that the 
courts simply thought the dissents in analogous federal cases more 
persuasive. But nothing in these state opinions gives you any idea of 
what you, as an advocate, could say to convince the state courts once 
again to reject the federal approach as a matter of state constitutional 
law. 
As a result of this uncertainty, you are unable to draft an argument 
in which you have the slightest confidence, and you end up throwing 
anything you can think of at the court and praying that something hits 
the mark. If you are really dispirited, you may decide to abandon the 
state constitutional claim entirely, concluding that your client's money 
is better spent on trying to develop a novel federal constitutional argu-
ment; at least you will have some chance of evaluating the merits of 
such an argument, whereas you have virtually no idea what will suc-
ceed or fail in state court. 
This story illustrates what I call the poverty of state constitutional 
discourse, by which I mean the lack of a language in which partici-
pants in the legal system can debate the meaning of the state constitu-
tion. Further, to the extent that such a state constitutional discourse 
exists, its terms and conventions are often borrowed wholesale from 
federal constitutional discourse, as though the language of federal con-
stitutional law were some sort of lingua franca of constitutional argu-
ment generally. My aim in this article is to demonstrate more 
formally the poverty of state constitutional discourse and to offer an 
explanation for this state of affairs. 
Specifically, Part I describes in more detail the concept of a state 
constitutional discourse. Part II examines the New Federalism move-
ment and its claims concerning the maturation of state constitutional 
law. In Part III, I summarize the results of a survey of over 1200 
cases decided by state supreme courts during 1990 to document my 
claim that state constitutional discourse is impoverished and inade-
quate to the tasks that any constitutional discourse is designed to ac-
complish. Part IV discusses and rejects three common explanations 
for the poverty of state constitutional discourse. In Part V, I argue 
that the real reason for the failure of state constitutional discourse is 
the failure of state constitutionalism itself, which is internally inconsis-
tent and relies on inadequate and outdated assumptions concerning 
the nature of state and national identity. As a result, state courts do 
not talk in the way state constitutionalism predicts because to do so 
would be to talk in a way that makes no sense. Part VI explores some 
possible resolutions of this dilemma. 
February 1992] State Constitutionalism 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
A. Definition 
767 
In the analysis that follows, I use the term constitutional discourse 
in a very specific sense. By constitutional discourse, I mean a lan-
guage and set of conventions that allow a participant in the legal system 
to make an intelligible claim about the meaning of the constitution. 
This definition is dense, so I will break it down somewhat. First, by 
"participant in the legal system," I mean primarily lawyers, judges, 
and litigants - the people who carry on the daily business of adjudi-
cating actual controversies within the legal system.13 Second, by 
"claim about the meaning of the constitution," I mean simply any 
statement to the effect that the relevant constitution, or any of its pro-
visions, has a certain meaning. Examples of such claims might include 
the following: "The constitution embodies our society's commitment 
to the treatment of all citizens with equal dignity"; or "The Fourth 
Amendment prohibits police officers from frisking an individual with-
out some reason to suspect that the individual may be armed"; or 
"Constitutional due process does not require the legislature to deal 
with every aspect of an economic problem at once." 
By "intelligible claim," I mean a claim about the meaning of the 
constitution that is (1) acknowledged by other participants in the legal 
system to be a proper way of talking about the meaning of the consti-
tution, and (2) capable of being understood by them, and therefore 
capable of being the subject of further constitutional discourse. These 
are simply the conditions necessary for any sort of meaningful conver-
sation to take place.14 With respect to a constitution, a claim must be 
intelligible if it is to be disputed by opposing counsel or adjudicated by 
a judge. In our legal system, for example, a claim about the meaning 
of the Constitution based on astrological portents would be considered 
unintelligible under this definition because astrological arguments are 
not acknowledged to be a proper way of talking about constitutions.15 
13. Much legal discourse incorporates the convenient fiction that only litigants make legal 
claims and arguments, and that their lawyers never do ("plaintiff argues," "defendant contends," 
and so on). Whether the litigant or the lawyer is considered the "real" participant in the legal 
system is immaterial to my analysis, although I expect that my analysis would be of interest 
primarily to lawyers, since they usually craft the arguments that form the actual raw material on 
which the legal system acts. 
14. See, e.g., JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow 33 (1985) [hereinafter WHITE, HERACLES]; 
JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 23 (1990) [hereinafter WHITE, TRANSLATION]; 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1233 (1987). 
15. Cf. PHILIP BOBBITI, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 6 (1982) ("[O]vert religious arguments or 
appeals to let the matter be decided by chance or by reading entrails ... are not part of our legal 
grammar."). 
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Finally, when I refer to "federal constitutional discourse" and 
"state constitutional discourse," I refer to a language and set of con-
ventions that allow participants in the legal system to make intelligible 
claims about the federal and state constitutions, respectively. 16 
This definition of constitutional discourse is at the same time nar-
row and broad. It is narrow in that it excludes talk about a constitu-
tion that takes place outside the legal system. Those who analyze 
constitutions in their sociological, ·political, or historical contexts 
doubtless engage in a useful sort of constitutional discourse, but it is a 
sort of discourse I shall not be concerned with here except to the ex-
tent that such analyses are or can be used within the legal system to 
support legal claims about the meaning of the Constitution.17 
On the other hand, the definition is broad in that it includes any-
thing at all that the participants in the legal system consider an appro-
priate argument about constitutional meaning. While some have 
argued that legitimate constitutional discourse should be confined to 
certain types of arguments - for example, arguments about the con-
stitutional text and intent of the Framers18 - I include here any type 
of argument widely made and accepted. Thus, if astrological or theo-
logical arguments were deemed by participants in the legal system to 
be appropriate bases for adjudicating constitutional claims, they would 
fall within the definition of constitutional discourse used here. 
B. The Significance of Constitutional Discourse 
Before going any further, it seems appropriate to ask: Why does 
constitutional discourse, thus defined, matter? Constitutional dis-
course matters very much, for several reasons. First, it is the means by 
which authoritative interpretations of constitutions are produced. In 
our system of government, not all expressions of opinion about consti-
tutions are equal; courts have the final say, 19 and, at least with respect 
to constitutional issues that come before them, the only say that is 
authoritative in terms of guiding real exercises of real governmental 
power. Because courts are passive in our system, responding only to 
16. Because federal constitutional claims can be raised in state courts, Martin v. Hunter's 
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), and state constitutional claims can be raised in certain 
federal court cases, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), I do not distinguish here between 
participants in the federal legal system and participants in state legal systems. 
17. For examples of studies of the role played by the U.S. Constitution in nonlegal public life, 
see MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF (1986) [hereinafter KAM· 
MEN, MACHINE]; MICHAEL KAMMEN, SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL DIS· 
COURSE IN AMERICAN CuLTURE (1988). 
18. See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide/or the Perplexed, 49 Omo ST. 
L.J. 1085 (1989). 
19. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
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requests for judicial action, constitutional discourse is generally the 
only means by which positive constitutional law is made, other than 
by adopting or amending a constitution. In this sense, constitutional 
discourse gives legal life to the constitution within the legal system of 
which the constitution is a part. 
But constitutional discourse is more than a mechanical procedure 
for producing the authoritative interpretations of the constitution 
needed to effectuate constitutional government. It is also the means by 
which participants in the legal system debate among themselves the 
meaning of the document. One side makes a claim about the meaning 
of the constitution; the other side responds by disputing that claim and 
making its own different one, which the first side disputes. The court 
then jumps into the exchange, questioning, accepting, rejecting, or 
modifying the claims made by the parties and reaching a conclusion. 
This debate among the participants plays a significant role in shaping 
the authoritative constitutional pronouncements the judicial system 
ultimately yields. 
That constitutional discourse comprises a debate about the mean-
ing of the constitution has important implications for a society that 
conceives of itself as living under that constitution. For what do we 
debate when we debate the meaning of a constitution? It has often 
been observed that any discourse is in a sense a means of self-defini-
tion, both for the individuals who engage in the discourse and the 
community of individuals among whom the discourse takes place.20 
As Richard Sherwin has argued, "it is through discourse itself that 
who we are and the community and culture we belong to take on an 
embodied existence in the world."21 Thus, virtually any type of dis-
course is a means of debating the identity - the internal roles, rela-
tions, and ethos - of the community in which it occurs.22 
But if this is true of discourse generally, it seems especially true of 
constitutional discourse because a constitution is a document that self-
consciously defines a communal identity. In Part V, I discuss the na-
ture of constitutions and American constitutionalism in some detail. 
For now, it is sufficient to say that a constitution, according to our 
legal and social conventions, is a document meant to identify a polit-
20. See, e.g., WHITE, TRANSLATION, supra note 14, at ix, 23, 217; WHITE, HERACLES, supra 
note 14, at 34, 80, 169; Richard Delgado, Storytelling far Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for 
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2412 (1989); Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary 
Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. l, 5 (1989). 
21. Richard K. Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and PloL" Belief and Suspicion in Legal Story-
telling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 543, 564 (1988). 
22. WHITE, HERACLES, supra note 14, at 34, 96, 98; WHITE, TRANSLATION, supra note 14, 
at 215-17. 
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ical community and to set out some of the most fundamental princi-
ples according to which the members of the community wish to live 
their lives. Consequently, to debate the meaning of a constitution, as 
participants in the legal system do when they engage in constitutional 
discourse, is to debate some aspect of the most fundamental character-
istics of the constitutional community's understanding of its own iden-
tity. It is to claim that we are (or are not) a certain type of people, 
who hold dear certain values and not others, and who act in certain 
ways in particular situations. 
Thus, constitutional discourse is an integral aspect not only of con-
stitutional law as a body of positive legal authority, but of societal self-
identification as well. As a result, to monitor a society's constitutional 
discourse is in an important sense to take the pulse of that society's 
efforts to understand itself. 
C. Federal Constitutional Discourse as a Model 
My purpose in Part III is to describe and criticize state constitu-
tional discourse as it is currently practiced. In particular, I shall argue 
that state constitutional discourse is "impoverished." In order to get a 
better sense of what this conclusion entails, we may usefully contrast 
state constitutional discourse with its far more successful cousin, 
American federal constitutional discourse. 
Our federal constitutional discourse is extraordinarily rich. Per-
haps as a result of the age or stability of the U.S. Constitution, a par-
ticipant in the legal system can today make claims about the meaning 
of the Constitution in a variety of ways. Among the types of argu-
ments about the meaning of the Constitution widely acknowledged to 
be appropriate are arguments from the language and structure of the 
constitutional text; from history and the intent of the Framers; from 
constitutional theory; from judicial precedent and legal doctrine; and 
from a virtually limitless number of value systems dealing with mat-
ters such as ethics, justice, and social policy.23 This is more than 
enough raw material to allow a wide variety of disparate claims about 
the meaning of the Constitution, including claims that some otherwise 
active participants in the discourse may well consider outlandish. In-
deed, some critics of federal constitutional jurisprudence, most 
prominently originalists, have argued that federal constitutional dis-
course is too rich - that too many types of arguments have been in-
corporated into the discourse, and that some of them do not furnish a 
23. See Fallon, supra note 14; BOBBITI, supra note 15. 
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legitimate language in which to make claims about the meaning of the 
Constitution. 24 
There is another reason for choosing federal constitutional dis-
course as a model of a successful constitutional discourse: it is the 
model adopted by the New Federalism movement as the one toward 
which state constitutional discourse should aspire. 
II. NEW FEDERALISM 
Today's New Federalism movement has its roots in two phenom-
ena. The first is the liberal reaction in the mid-1970s to the jurispru-
dence of the Burger Court. As the Burger Court slowed the expansion 
of constitutionally protected individual rights begun by the Warren 
Court, many liberals began to look to state courts to take up the War-
ren Court's legacy in the form of rights-protective state constitutional 
rulings.25 The second phenomenon is a much older and sparser tradi-
tion of criticizing state courts for ignoring state constitutions as a 
source of law and for failing to develop vigorous and independent bod-
ies of state constitutional law irrespective of the character of the con-
stitutional jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court.26 This strand of 
thought is often marked by criticism of state constitutions as well, 
often on the ground that state constitutions are poorly thought out or 
insufficiently "constitutional" in outlook.27 
The marriage of these two schools gave birth to a New Federalism 
movement whose adherents, although occasionally impelled by differ-
ent motives,28 shared the ultimate goal of creating in every state a vig-
orous, independent body of state constitutional law capable of 
24. For an overview of originalisrn, see Farber, supra note 18. 
25. See Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REv. 271 (1973) [hereinafter Project Report]; Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 1; Je-
rome B. Falk, Jr., The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL. 
L. REV. 273 (1973); A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the 
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); see also Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Consti-
tutions -Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9 HAsnNGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981); Sanford Lev-
inson, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Access to Private Property Under State Constitutional 
Law, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 51. 
26. See Scott H. Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750 
(1972); Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process'': Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 
125 (1970); William F. Swindler, State Constitutions for the 20th Century, 50 NEB. L. REV. 577, 
583-89 (1971); Orrin K. McMurray, Note, Some Tendencies in Constitution Making, 2 CAL. L. 
REV. 203, 220-24 (1914); Note, California's Constitutional Amendomania, 1 STAN. L. REV. 279, 
280-81 (1949) [hereinafter Note, Amendomania]; see generally Charles R. Adrian, Trends in 
State Constitutions, 5 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311 (1968). 
27. See, e.g., Swindler, supra note 26, at 590, 593; McMurray, supra note 26, at 207, 210; 
Note, Amendomania, supra note 26, at 279-80. 
28. Peter R. Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review 
Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REv. 13, 34-35 (1988). 
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standing by itself as a basis for constitutional rulings by state courts. 
Both groups also shared the belief that state constitutional law was not 
living up to its potential as a source of independent law. Much of the 
early literature was therefore devoted to criticizing state court deci-
sions for what New Federalism advocates saw as sloppy or inappropri-
ate constitutional decisionmaking practices. These practices included 
avoiding reliance on state constitutions altogether;29 analyzing state 
constitutions in a perfunctory manner that provided little guidance to 
litigants and lower courts;30 and inappropriately relying on federal rul-
ings and analyses as a guide to construction of state constitutions.31 
As New Federalism matured, its adherents began increasingly to 
take the view that state constitutional jurisprudence should be some-
thing more than a vehicle for relitigating civil rights battles lost in the 
federal courts. Although some critics have argued that virtually all 
New Federalism proponents are motivated by the bare desire to 
achieve a liberal political agenda,32 it seems clear that an ovenvhelm-
ing consensus has developed within the movement that "reactive" 
state constitutional jurisprudence - state rulings that reject federal 
constitutional decisions merely because the state court disagrees with 
the result - is generally inappropriate. 33 Rather, state constitutional 
29. E.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 957-58 
(1982) (observing that most state courts failed to look to state constitutions); Abrahamson, supra 
note 5, at 1147 (noting that state courts fell silent in this area from the late 1950s through the 
1970s); Charles G. Douglas, III, State Judicial Activism - The New Role for State Bills of Rights, 
12 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1123, 1144 (1978) (state constitutions "moribund"); Stanley Mosk, State 
Constitutionalism After Wa"en: Avoiding the Potomac's Ebb and Flow, in DEVELOPMENTS IN 
STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 201 ("(S]tate courts were guilty of a dismal 
performance in enforcing provisions of their own constitutions."); Ellen A. Peters, State Consti· 
tutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583, 587 (1986) 
(State constitutional law suffered "generations of neglect - for which state courts bear a great 
deal of responsibility."); Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: Some Random 
Thoughts, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 1, 4 (describ-
ing state constitutional law as "dormant"). 
30. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 379, 390 (1980). 
31. Todd F. Simon, Independent But Inadequate: State Constitutions and Protection of Free-
dom of Expression, 33 KAN. L. REV. 305, 308 (1985); Developments in State Constitutional Law: 
1989, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 903, 1111 (1990); see also Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Toward a New Partner· 
ship: The Future Relationship of Federal and State Constitutional Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REV, 729, 
736-37 (1988). 
32. E.g., Earl M. Maltz, The Political Dynamic of the "New Judicial Federalism," 2 EMERCJ· 
ING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 233, 233 (1989). 
33. E.g., Collins, supra note 25, at 2-3; Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial 
Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 779, 786 (1982); Ken 
Gormley, Ten Adventures in State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 29, 
35 (1988); A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES 
IN ST. CONST. L. l, 12-13 (1988); Paul S. Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: 
The Case for Judicial Restraint, 63 DENVER U. L. REV. 85, 95 (1985); Kaye, supra note 5, at 
418; Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the 
State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 300 (1977). 
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law must go its own way not in order to achieve a particular result, but 
because it is jurisprudentially an independent body of law. 
New Federalism advocates support their arguments for state con-
stitutional independence in several ways. Some claim a historical pri-
macy for state constitutions. State constitutions, they argue, predated 
the federal Constitution and served in many respects as models con-
sulted by the drafters of the federal Constitution and Bill of Rights. 34 
In addition, state constitutions were originally intended to be the pri-
mary vehicles for protecting the liberties of Americans, not the supple-
mentary charters they have in many ways become. 35 Others stress the 
many differences between the state and federal constitutions. They ar-
gue that a state constitution is a charter of government created by and 
for a different political sovereign; that it is a distinct document with a 
text that often differs significantly from its federal counterpart; and 
that state courts are institutions distinct from federal courts in both 
their authority and the circumstances under which that authority is 
exercised. 36 These differences, it is argued, necessarily give rise to a 
distinct and independent body of law. 
Finally, some argue that a vigorous and independent body of state 
constitutional law is not only contemplated, but virtually required, by 
the American system of federalism. In a federal system, the states are 
supposed to be counterweights to federal power, an arrangement 
designed to protect liberty.37 A strong, independent state constitu-
tional jurisprudence is an important aspect of state power and inde-
pendence, and thus a necessary condition of a healthy federalism. 38 
34. Norman Dorsen, State Constitutional Law: An Introductory Survey, 15 CONN. L. REV. 
99, 99-101 (1982); Linde, supra note 30, at 380-81; Wilkes, supra note 6, at 223-24; Ronald F. 
Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARYL. REV. 169, 175 (1983). 
35. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833); Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate 
and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and 
Federal Courts, 63 TExAs L. REV. 977, 979 (1985); Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Divers(ty in a 
Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, in 
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 239, 239. 
36. See Howard, supra note 25, at 934-40; Howard, supra note 33, at 1, 8; Kaye, supra note 
5, at 403; Linde, supra note 5, at 173, 181-83; Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and 
the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 893-901 (1989); Lawrence Gene Sager, 
Foreword: State Constitutions and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constitu-
tional Law, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 959, 973-76 (1985); Utter, supra note 35, at 241-43; Williams, 
supra note 6, at 355, 397-404. 
37. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45, 46 (James Madison). 
38. See Collins, supra note 25, at 5-6; Shirley S. Abrahamson, Homegrown Justice: The State 
Constitutions, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 306, 314. 
For a different view, see Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 98 (1988); Maltz, supra note 3. It has also been suggested 
that the U.S. Constitution pursues federalism even more directly by giving states the power to 
create federal constitutional rights; this occurs because the content of the rights protected by the 
Ninth Amendment is dictated by the content of the rights protected by state constitutions. See 
Calvin R. Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and Its Implications for State Constitu-
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As Justice Stanley Mask of the California Supreme Court has ob-
served, New Federalism thus offers something for both liberals and 
conservatives: it can offer liberals a continuation of the Warren 
Court's expansion of constitutional rights, while at the same time of-
fering conservatives "the triumph of federalism."39 
Although New Federalism proponents are basically united on the 
need for vigorous, independent state constitutional law, they divide 
over the issue of how such a body of law should be developed. A 
sizable majority seems to prefer what has come to be known as the 
"primacy" approach to state constitutional interpretation,40 an ap-
proach usually identified with former Oregon Supreme Court Justice 
Hans Linde, who has been called the "intellectual godfather" of New 
Federalism. 41 The primacy approach holds that state courts con-
fronted with constitutional issues should look to the state constitution 
in the first instance and should interpret it in a principled way that 
takes account of the text, history, structure, and underlying values of 
the document. 42 In other words, state courts should approach their 
state constitutions just as the U.S. Supreme Court would approach the 
federal Constitution - as a unique and highly significant document 
with a meaning that can and must be derived through independent 
analysis of the document itself. 
In contrast, a minority of New Federalism proponents prefer the 
"interstitial" approach to state constitutional adjudication.43 This ap-
proach holds that state courts should look in the first instance to the 
federal Constitution where that document. can provide a basis for deci-
sion. Only if federal constitutional law approves the challenged state 
action, or is ambiguous, should the state court then tum to the state 
tional Law, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1229; Eric B. Schnurer, It Is a Constitution We Are Expanding: 
An Essay on Constitutional Past, Present, and Future, 1 EMERGING lssUES IN ST. CONST. L. 135 
(1988). 
39. Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEXAS L. 
REV. 1081, 1081 (1985). 
40. Among the many who have endorsed the primacy approach are Abrahamson, supra note 
29, at 962-63; Douglas, supra note 29, at 1145-46; Falk, supra note 25, at 285-86; Project Report, 
supra note 25, at 289; Frank G. Mahady, Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Jurisprudence: 
A Judge's Thoughts, 13 VT. L. REv. 145, 146 (1988); Simon, supra note 31, at 316; Utter, supra 
note 35, at 247; Collins, supra note 29, at 7-9. 
41. Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: The Once ''New Judicial Federalism" & Its Critics, 64 
w ASH. L. REV. 5, 5 (1989) (quoting Jeffrey Toobin, Better Than Burger, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 
4, 1985, at 10, 11). 
42. Linde, supra note 5, at 178-81; Linde, supra note 30, at 380, 392. 
43. Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. 
REv. 1324, 1330-31 (1982) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; Hudnut, supra note 33, at 99-
100; see also Peters, supra note 29, at 589-92 (advocating flexible approach to state constitutional 
interpretation). 
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constitution.44 According to Justice Stewart Pollock of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, the most articulate defender of the interstitial 
approach, this method is preferable to the primacy approach because 
it acknowledges the U.S. Constitution as the basic protector of individ-
ual rights in our society.45 State constitutional law thus plays a more 
modest role than it would under the primacy approach.46 However, 
Justice Pollock has cautioned that in order to avoid a state constitu-
tional jurisprudence that merely reacts to federal rulings, state courts 
must diverge from federal holdings and results only in accordance 
with appropriate objective criteria.47 
In 1983, New Federalism received an unlikely boost from the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In Michigan v. Long, 48 the Court reconsidered its 
prior rulings concerning the doctrine of adequate and independent 
state grounds. Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court will not review 
a state court decision that rests on state law grounds even if the state 
decision also rests on federal law grounds for which a federal appeal 
normally would be available.49 The Court had reasoned that because 
state law is unreviewable by federal courts, a Supreme Court decision 
on the federal issue could not affect the outcome of the case and would 
therefore be an advisory opinion beyond the Court's Article III juris-
diction. 50 In Long, the Court held that it would henceforth consider a 
state court decision to rest on adequate and independent state grounds 
only if it "indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based 
on bona fide, separate, adequate, and independent grounds."51 Thus, 
the Court now requires state courts to say explicitly when their deci-
44. Pollock, supra note 2, at 718; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 13S6-66 
(discussing application of the interstitial model). 
4S. Pollock, supra note 2, at 718. 
46. See Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 13S8 ("The state court's role is not to 
construct a complete system of fundamental rights from the ground up."). 
47. Pollock, supra note 2, at 718; see also State v. Hunt, 4SO A.2d 9S2, 96S-67 (N.J. 1982) 
(Handler, J., concurring) (suggesting seven criteria for determining when the court should di-
verge from federal constitutional law). 
A third approach has been identified in which state courts resolve all parallel state and federal 
constitutional claims regardless of the outcome of either analysis; that is, the court will not stop 
its analysis after turning to one constitution or the other, even if that analysis provides a defini-
tive resolution to the case. This approach has been accurately criticized for creating an unre-
viewable state body of federal constitutional dicta. Bice, supra note 26; Pollock, supra note 3S, at 
983. But see Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on 
Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEXAS 
L. REV. 102S, 1029-41 (198S) (arguing that this approach allows state courts to contribute to the 
development of federal constitutional law). 
48. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
49. 463 U.S. at 1038-42. 
SO. 463 U.S. at 1040; Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 12S-26 (194S), overruled on other 
grounds by Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
SI. 463 U.S. at 1041. 
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sions rest on state grounds if state courts want to insulate their deci-
sions from Supreme Court review. 
Some New Federalism proponents have condemned Long because 
they view it as resting on a presumption that state courts will decide 
cases on federal grounds, a presumption that they consider disrespect-
ful to state sovereignty and contrary to established principles of feder-
alism. 52 This criticism is greatly overblown. Not only can the Long 
requirement of clarity be satisfied simply by adding a caption or ex-
planatory sentence to a court's opinion, 53 but it requires state courts to 
do exactly what New Federalism proponents have been urging them to 
do: think explicitly about the grounds of their decisions, and make 
those grounds clear in their opinions. S4 
All in all, New Federalism advocates seem unremittingly optimis-
tic about the prospects for achieving the movement's goals. They 
point with pride to the fact that state courts have decided over four 
hundred cases construing state constitutions to provide greater protec-
tions for individual rights than the federal Constitution.ss They write 
articles about state constitutional law with titles that include words 
such as "revival," "reincarnation," "renaissance," "revolution," and 
"reemergence."56 They devote close scholarly attention to independ-
ent state constitutional decisions, s7 and they have held numerous sym-
52. See, e.g., William W. Greenhalgh, Independent and Adequate State Grounds: The Long 
and the Short of It, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 211, 
214-21. 
53. The New Hampshire Supreme Court routinely does this. See infra notes 172-74 and 
accompanying text. 
54. Joseph R. Grodin, Some Reflections on State Constitutions, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
391, 399 (1988). See also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). There the 
Supreme Court refused to disturb on federal constitutional grounds a California ruling that the 
state constitution provided greater protections to freedom of speech than did the federal Consti-
tution. 447 U.S. at 88. In reaching this decision the Court relied on the California Supreme 
Court's clearly stated reasons for concluding that broader state-protected rights of expression did 
not impermissibly infringe on appellants' federal property or First Amendment rights. 447 U.S. 
at 78, 83-84. 
55. David Schuman, The Right to "Equal Privileges and Immunities": A State's Version of 
"Equal Protection," 13 VT. L. REv. 221, 221 (1988); see also Sol Wachtler, Our Constitutions -
Alive and Well. 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 381, 397 (1987) (stating that state courts issued 350 such 
opinions between 1970 and 1984). 
56. Abrahamson, supra note 29, at 951; Brennan, Bill of Rights, supra note 1, at 535; James 
C. Harrington, Reemergence of Texas Constitutional Protection, 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. 
CONST. L. 101, 101 (1989); Howard, supra note 33, at 1; Symposium on the Revolution in State 
Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REv. 11, 11 (1988). 
57. See, e.g., John H. Buttler, Oregon's Constitutional Renaissance: Federalism Revisited, 13 
VT. L. REV. 107 (1988); Galie, supra note 33; Howard, supra note 33; Howard, supra note 25; 
Levinson, supra note 25, at 51; Simon, supra note 31; Wilkes, supra note 6; Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., 
The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure in 1984: Death of the Phoenix?, in DEVELOPMENTS 
JN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 166; Williams, supra note 6. 
February 1992] State Constitutionalism 777 
posia on state constitutional law.58 A new journal called Emerging 
Issues in State Constitutional Law has even been established to provide 
a forum for such commentary. 59 
Is this optimism well founded? Have state courts responded to 
Justice Brennan's call and begun to develop, in the past fifteen years, 
an independent jurisprudence of state constitutional law? The answer 
will be found by examining current state constitutional discourse. If a 
robust, independent state constitutional law exists, it must be mani-
fested by an equally robust and independent state constitutional dis-
course that allows participants in state legal systems to raise, debate, 
and adjudicate claims about the meaning of state constitutions. 60 
New Federalism predicts that such a discourse could take two pos-
sible forms. If a state adopted the primacy approach to constitutional 
adjudication, it would develop a state constitutional discourse in 
which intelligible claims about the meaning of the state constitution 
could be based on the text, history, structure, and underlying values of 
the state constitution. Such a discourse would in all likelihood closely 
resemble federal constitutional discourse in tone and style, although 
its participants would be free to accept or reject the legitimacy of any 
or all of the language or conventions of the cognate federal discourse. 
Moreover, any similarities in case outcomes or doctrine would be 
purely fortuitous, since the state discourse would stand on its own. 
Thus, if a state court happened to reach the same result under the state 
constitution as the federal courts have reached under the U.S. Consti-
tution, that congruity might only reflect the fact that both constitu-
tions are rooted in similar historical or political circumstances. 
If a state adopted an interstitial approach to constitutional adjudi-
cation, its state constitutional discourse would take a slightly different 
form. Instead of being independent and internally complete, such a 
discourse would focus on the ways in which the state and federal con-
58. E.g., DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7 (Williamsburg 
Conference); State Constitutions in a Federal System, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 
1 (1988); Symposium on State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 15 liAsTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. 391 
(1988); Symposium on State Constitutional Law, 64 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1989); Symposium on the 
Revolution in State Constitutional Law, supra note 56; Symposium, The Emergence of State Con-
stitutional Law, 63 TExAs L. REv. 959 (1985); Symposium, Special Section: The Connecticut 
Constitution, 15 CoNN. L. REV. 7 (1982). 
59. The journal is published by the National Association of Attorneys General. The inaugu-
ral issue appeared in 1988. 
60. See supra section I.B. This is a very different method of evaluating the condition of state 
constitutional law than that employed by many New Federalists, who seem to view the number 
of state decisions deviating from federal law as an important indicator of the health of state 
constitutional law. However, deviations from federal law alone do not necessarily indicate the 
presence of a robust and independent state constitutional discourse. See infra notes 143-50 and 
accompanying text. 
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stitutions differ from each other. Thus, state constitutional discourse 
would be a "discourse of distinctness" - it would comprise a lan-
guage and set of conventions enabling participants in the legal system 
to argue that provisions of the state constitution mean something dif-
ferent from their federal counterparts. Because this discourse would 
use federal constitutional discourse as a starting point, it would proba-
bly have to incorporate the various elements of federal constitutional 
discourse such as text, framers' intent, constitutional theory, judicial 
precedent, and societal values. However, state constitutional dis-
course would contain additional features that would allow participants 
to apply these elements of federal constitutional discourse to the state 
constitution and to construct intelligible arguments that the state and 
federal constitutions differ in dispositive ways. 61 
It is possible, and perhaps likely, that these two different types of 
state constitutional discourse would end up looking very much the 
same. If there were an irreducible difference between them, it would 
be this: while both types of discourse would yield meanings for the 
state constitution, participants in a discourse accompanying the inter-
stitial approach would care fundamentally about the meaning of the 
federal Constitution, whereas participants in a discourse accompany-
ing the primacy approach would not. 
With this discussion in mind, we now have the tools to assess the 
optimistic claims of New Federalism. In the next Part, I review state 
constitutional discourse as it was practiced in 1990, and conclude that 
it not only falls immensely short of New Federalism ideals, but often 
seems barely to exist at all. 62 
III. THE POVERTY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
The editors of the Draft Model State Constitution have accurately 
observed that there can really be no such thing as a model state consti-
tution because there is no such thing as a model state. 63 It unfortu-
nately follows that the only completely accurate way to examine the 
status of state constitutional law would be to look at every relevant 
61. The interstitial approach is generally less applicable to state constitutional provisions 
without federal analogue, of which there are many. See infra notes 243-55 and accompanying 
text. Proponents of the interstitial approach have not outlined how they would interpret such 
provisions, but it seems that they would be driven by necessity to use something like the primacy 
approach. 
62. I should note here that the reader who is willing to accept my conclusions about the 
poverty of state constitutional discourse, whether from personal experience or on faith, can skip 
·the following Part and turn directly to my analysis of the problem in Parts IV and V without loss 
of continuity. 
63. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION vii (rev. 6th ed. 1968). 
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decision of every state court. That would have' made my project un-
manageable, so I have narrowed the field of inquiry in four ways. 
First, I have confined myself to a sampling of seven states: New York, 
Massachusetts, Virginia, Louisiana, California, Kansas, and New 
Hampshire. 64 Second, I have examined only decisions of the highest 
court of each state. 65 Third, I have excluded decisions in which the 
state high court did not write a full opinion, or at least perform some 
kind of legal analysis. Thus, I have not considered summary or mem-
orandum decisions, or any other type of decision that does not reveal 
in the decision itself the nature of the case and the court's reasoning. 
Finally, I have confined my analysis to cases decided during a single 
year, 1990, the most recent for which published state high court deci-
64. I selected this sample in the following way. Going into the research, I hypothesized that 
five factors might be relevant to the condition of constitutional law and discourse in any given 
state: (1) the size of the state; (2) its age; (3) the presence of an unusual founding history; 
(4) the continuity of its constitutional traditions; and (5) the nature of the constitutional text. 
The size of the state would be relevant because of the sheer number of cases litigated: the more 
constitutional cases litigated, the more constitutional rulings made, and the more developed the 
state's body of constitutional law. The age of the state would be relevant for the same reason; 
older states would have had a longer period in which to develop a substantial body of constitu-
tional rulings. An unusual founding history would be relevant in that it might be reflected in the 
state constitution, thereby providing an occasion for developing constjtutional doctrines different 
from federal constitutional law. The presence of such differences might then serve as a focal 
point for the development of a strong, independent body of state constitutional law. The con-
tinuity of a state's constitutional traditions would be relevant in two ways. First, a constitution 
in long continuous use is more likely to be extensively construed than a relatively new document. 
Second, a history of frequent constitutional revisions might be indicative of an approach by the 
people of the state toward constitutional law that differs from the approach taken by the nation 
toward the national Constitution. Finally, peculiarities of the constitutional text might be the 
occasion for developing independent bodies of state constitutional law; they might also indicate 
underlying state attitudes concerning the functions that constitutions ought to serve. In looking 
at state constitutions in this last category, however, it became clear that the search for "peculiari-
ties" would be too subjective, so I decided eventually to look only at the length of the constitu-
tional text. 
According to these criteria, a representative sample of states would include states of varying 
sizes, ages, and histories, with constitutional traditions of varying continuity and constitutions of 
varying lengths. To keep the sample size manageable, I tried to choose states that were interest-
ing for more than one quality. The states selected fit the criteria as follows. New York and 
California are very large, and New Hampshire is very small. New York, Massachusetts, Vir-
ginia, and New Hampshire are very old states; Louisiana, Kansas, and California are intermedi-
ate to young. I avoided extremely young states such as Alaska and Hawaii because it seemed 
unlikely that they have had the time necessary to develop a substantial body of constitutional 
law. Louisiana has an unusual history of French and Spanish influence, and is the only state in 
the union to retain a civil law system. New York, with its background of early Dutch settlement, 
also has a somewhat atypical history. With respect to continuity, Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire have had only one constitution each since they became states; Louisiana has had 
eleven constitutions, the most of any state. Finally, the New Hampshire and Massachusetts 
constitutions are among the shortest of state constitutions, the New York constitution among the 
longest. Kansas fell into the middle of the pack in virtually every category, and was selected for 
that reason. 
65. This is probably just as well, since it seems that state supreme courts are far more likely 
to devote sustained attention to state constitutional issues than are lower state courts. Also, it is 
often difficult to obtain good data on state trial court decisions. In contrast, state supreme court 
opinions are all published and readily available. 
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sions were available. 66 These reductions yielded an overall sample size 
of 1208 cases. 
In addition to systematically examining the cases included in the 
sample, I have also delved more anecdotally into decisions rendered in 
other states and in different years. This spot-checking supports the 
conclusions derived from studying the primary sample. 
A. General Trends 
1. The Infrequency of State Constitutional Decisions 
One of the most striking aspects of state constitutional decisions is 
their relative infrequency. In calendar year 1990, the U.S. Supreme 
Court issued 137 full opinions, of which 73, or 53%, involved resolu-
tion of at least one federal constitutional issue. None of the state 
courts surveyed here construed its own state constitution with any-
thing remotely approaching that frequency. Even using the most gen-
erous method of counting state constitutional decisions, 67 the courts of 
the sample states decided state constitutional issues in only about 21 % 
of their cases, or about 40% as often as the U.S. Supreme Court con-
strued the federal Constitution. Broken down by state, the rates were 
California, 31 %; Massachusetts, 24%; New Hampshire, 26%; New 
York, 20%; Kansas, 18%; Louisiana, 15%; and Virginia, 7%.68 
66. While focusing on a single year may result in some distortion due to annual variations in 
caseload and the like, I suspect that the more recent the focus, the more any distortion would 
tend to favor the predictions of New Federalism. This is because independent state constitu-
tional decisions are more likely with the passage of time, for two reasons. First, the more recent 
the year, the more time the message of the New Federalism has had to penetrate the state judi-
ciaries. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court continues each year to slow or reverse the expansion of 
federally protected rights, thus providing state courts with more to react against, to the extent 
that their constitutional jurisprudence is at heart a reactive one. 
67. A small percentage of the opinions surveyed were unclear as to whether the courts' hold-
ings rose to constitutional dimensions; a much larger percentage were unclear as to whether the 
courts' rulings were based on the state or federal constitution. For the purpose of comparing 
constitutional decision rates, I have counted all these ambiguous decisions among the state con-
stitutional rulings. However, I have excluded rulings that unambiguously relied only on the U.S. 
Constitution. For a more complete breakdown of state decisions, see infra note 68. For a discus-
sion of cases that do not clearly identify the constitution upon which the court relies, see infra 
notes 85-98 and accompanying text. 
68. The actual numbers are as follows (all figures refer to cases decided in 1990). In 1990, 
the New York Court of Appeals issued 240 opinions containing some kind of legal analysis. Of 
these, 184 involved no constitutional issue of any kind, 7 involved only a federal constitutional 
claim, and 37 dealt with state constitutional claims. An additional 12 opinions left unclear 
whether the holding of the case rose to constitutional dimensions. During the same period, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued 273 full opinions. Of these, 186 involved no con· 
stitutional issues, 12 raised only a federal constitutional issue, 62 arguably dealt with at least one 
state constitutional question, and in 13 cases it was unclear whether the ruling had constitutional 
dimensions. 
The Virginia Supreme Court over the same period issued 147 full opinions. Of these, 130 
involved no constitutional issue, 7 raised only a federal constitutional claim, and 8 arguably 
involved state constitutional claims. In another 2 cases, it was unclear whether the ruling bad 
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State constitutional law thus comprises a significantly smaller pro-
portion of the state high court docket than federal constitutional law 
does for the Supreme Court. Although it is not clear from this data 
alone whether the dearth of state constitutional cases is due to the 
failure of litigants to raise such claims or to a weeding out of constitu-
tional cases due to jurisdictional or procedural considerations, I sug-
gest reasons below to suspect the former. Either way, the lack of 
decisions alone retards the development of state constitutional law and 
discourse - the development of a language, after all, requires the op-
portunity to speak. 69 
2. Grudging Resort to the State Constitution 
Just as striking as the infrequency of state constitutional decisions, 
and undoubtedly one of its causes, is what can only be characterized as 
a general unwillingness among state supreme courts to engage in any 
kind of analysis of the state constitution at all. I will use New York as 
an example, although this unwillingness exists to an equal or greater 
extent in Massachusetts, Virginia, and Kansas, and to a somewhat 
lesser extent in California and Louisiana. 
The grudging character of the New York Court of Appeals' state 
constitutional analyses permeates the great majority of its decisions in 
the sample. In 1990, the court decided 37 cases that can arguably be 
viewed as resting in whole or in part on the state constitution. In 12 of 
them, the only mention of the state constitution consists of either a 
passing acknowledgement that a party is raising a state constitutional 
claim; a citation, without further comment, to the state constitution; 
or the bare assertion that the case comes out the same way under both 
the state and federal constitutions. 70 In other words, the opinions con-
constitutional dimensions. The Louisiana Supreme Court issued 149 full opinions, of which 119 
involved no constitutional issue, 8 raised only federal constitutional issues, 21 dealt with at least 
one state constitutional issue, and one was unclear as to its constitutional roots. 
The California Supreme Court issued 118 full opinions in 1990, of which 36 contained at least 
one issue of state constitutional law. An additional 76 involved no constitutional issue, and 6 
cases dealt only with federal constitutional issues. The Kansas Supreme Court issued 142 opin-
ions; 100 of these raised no constitutional issue, 16 dealt only with federal constitutional issues, 
21 involved or arguably involved state constitutional issues, and in 5 cases it was unclear whether 
the case had constitutional dimensions. 
In 1990, the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued 139 full opinions. Of these, 98 did not 
address any constitutional question, 34 dealt with state constitutional claims, 5 involved only 
federal claims, and in 2 cases it was unclear whether the case had constitutional dimensions. 
69. This may be especially true given that state constitutions are on average almost four 
times as long as the U.S Constitution. Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State 
Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 57, 74-76 (1982). It seems logical that state constitutions would thus 
require considerably more exegesis than the federal Constitution in order to play a comparable 
role in state Jaw. 
70. People v. Carter, 566 N.E.2d 119, 120, 123 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1599 
(1991); Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino, 564 N.E.2d 1046, 1047, 1049 (N.Y. 1990); People 
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tain nothing that could be regarded as analysis of the state constitu-
tion. In 12 more opinions, there is no mention of or citation to any 
constitution; the court merely holds that some "right" or "constitu-
tional right" is at issue. 71 
Consider some examples. In People v. Sides, 72 a criminal defend-
ant claimed inadequate assistance of counsel under both the state and 
federal constitutions. The court held that the defendant's "right to 
counsel" had been violated, but gave no indication of whether the rele-
vant right was a state or federal one. 73 In People v. Cain, 74 the court 
reversed a conviction on the ground that the defendant had been de-
nied his "right to be present, with counsel, at all material stages of a 
trial."75 The court then cited both the U.S. and New York constitu-
tions, but did not say whether its ruling rested on one or both.76 In In 
re Jamal C., 77 the court ruled that the respondent had "no constitu-
tional right to the presence of counsel. " 78 The court did not cite any 
constitution at all. In none of these cases did the court make any 
statement of the kind required by Michigan v. Long to the effect that 
its decision rested on adequate and independent state grounds. 
In each of these cases it is essentially impossible to determine by 
reading the case whether it is a state constitutional ruling at all. Such 
cases squelch the development of state constitutional discourse in at 
least two ways. First, ambiguity about the basis of the court's ruling 
v. Ortiz, 564 N.E.2d 630, 632 (N.Y. 1990); Schneider v. Sobol, 558 N.E.2d 23, 24 (N.Y. 1990); 
McKenzie v. Jackson, 556 N.E.2d 1072 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Basora, 556 N.E.2d 1070, 1071 
(N.Y. 1990); People v. Cain, 556 N.E.2d 141, 143 (N.Y. 1990); Seelig v. Koehler, 556 N.E.2d 
125, 126 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 134 (1990); Forti v. New York State Ethics 
Commn., 554 N.E.2d 876, 882-86 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 624 (N.Y. 
1990), ajfd. sub nom. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991); People v. Sides, 551 
N.E.2d 1233, 1234 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Cintron, 551 N.E.2d 561, 566, 567 (N.Y. 1990). 
71. People v. Rodriguez, 564 N.E.2d 658, 659 (N.Y. 1990) ("due process right to be present 
at trial"); People v. LaClere, 564 N.E.2d 640, 641 (N.Y. 1990) ("right to counsel"); People v. 
Thomas, 563 N.E.2d 280, 281 (N.Y. 1990) ("right to have counsel at the lineup"); People v. 
Gordon, 563 N.E.2d 274, 275 (N.Y. 1990) ("showup identification"); City of New York v. State, 
562 N.E.2d 118, 121 (N.Y. 1990) ("equal protection argument"); People v. Harris, 559 N.E.2d 
660, 661 (N.Y. 1990) ("due process" right); In re Lionel F., 558 N.E.2d 30, 31 (N.Y. 1990) 
("double jeopardy"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 304 (1990); People v. Garcia, 555 N.E.2d 902, 902 
(N.Y. 1990) ("ineffective assistance of counsel"); People v. Wandell, 554 N.E.2d 1274, 1274 
(N.Y. 1990) ("effective assistance of counsel"); People v. Gonzales, 554 N.E.2d 1269, 1270 (N.Y. 
1990) ("right to counsel"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 99 (1990); In re Jamal C., 553 N.E.2d 1018, 
1019 (N.Y. 1990) ("constitutional right to the presence of counsel"); People v. Tuck, 551 N.E.2d 
578, 578 (N.Y. 1990) ("right to confrontation"). 
72. 551 N.E.2d 1233, 1234 (N.Y. 1990). 
73. 551 N.E.2d at 1235. 
74. 556 N.E.2d 141 (N.Y. 1990). 
75. 556 N.E.2d at 143. 
76. 556 N.E.2d at 143. 
77. 553 N.E.2d 1018 (N.Y. 1990). 
78. 553 N.E.2d at 1019. 
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impairs the usefulness of a case for the purpose of debating the mean-
ing of the state constitution. This is because it is highly awkward, if 
not impossible, to use a case as the basis for an argument about the 
meaning of the state constitution if it is unclear from the case itself 
whether the case is even about the state constitution. 
Second, such ambiguity is self-perpetuating. Suppose one party 
claims that a case construes the state constitution and the other party 
contends that it deals with the federal Constitution. It is very unlikely 
that a state court, particularly a lower court, will attempt to resolve 
such a dispute. In all likelihood, the court will hold that it need not 
resolve the ambiguity; all we need to know, the court will say, is that 
controlling state precedent recognizes the existence of a constitutional 
right in the circumstances at hand. Consequently, the court need only 
apply the ambiguous case, resulting in a ruling of equal ambiguity. 
Eventually, a small body oflaw may evolve that cannot be traced with 
any confidence to either the state or federal constitutions. 79 Such a 
development can only inhibit the creation of a robust state constitu-
tional discourse. The most fundamental requirement for the creation 
of a discourse is agreement concerning when participants should be 
understood to be engaging in the discourse. Decisions such as these 
virtually preclude any such understanding. 
Just as important, however, is the message that the court sends 
when, like the New York Court of Appeals, 65% of its decisions ex-
plicitly or arguably involving the state constitution share these flaws. 
The message is: "This activity is not important to us. We will not 
treat such claims with much attention or care, so you are probably 
wasting your time raising them." It is hard to conceive of a lawyer 
who would spend much time developing a thorough or novel state 
constitutional claim after receiving such a message from the state's 
highest court. 
The result of the Court of Appeals' approach to state constitu-
tional claims has been to discourage litigants from making such claims 
at all. This discouragement appears between the lines of New York 
decisions, which show their disdain for the state constitution by giving 
short shrift to the great majority of state constitutional claims. But 
another important sign of this discouragement is the comparatively 
low proportion of cases - probably no more than 15%80 - on the 
79. For an example of this, see the discussion of State v. Prewett, infra notes 96-98 and 
accompanying text. 
80. See supra note 68 for a numerical breakdown of decisions. The 15% figure is derived by 
counting state constitutional decisions in a more realistic way than they were counted in note 67, 
supra, that is, by excluding from the total those decisions that were unclear as to whether they 
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Court of Appeals docket that even request a state constitutional ruling 
of any kind. 
This last conclusion is borne out by other data. For example, both 
the New York and U.S. constitutions protect the freedom of speech.81 
In 1990, New York trial courts issued a total of 3 published opinions 
dealing with free speech claims under the state constitution. 82 During 
the same period, U.S. district courts sitting in New York issued 15 
published opinions adjudicating free speech claims under the First 
Amendment. 83 This suggests that when litigants in New York had a 
choice of going to federal or state court on constitutional issues deal-
ing with free speech, they overwhelmingly chose to go to federal court, 
even though they may thereby have lost the chance to raise a claim 
under the state constitution. Obviously, these litigants placed a very 
low value on the opportunity to raise a state constitutional claim. 84 
had any sort of constitutional dimension. That leaves 37 out of 240 cases, or approximately 
15%. 
81. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I; N.Y. CoNsr. art. I,§ 8. 
82. People v. Perkins, 558 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Dist. Ct. 1990); People v. Reynolds, 554 N.Y.S.2d 
391 (City Ct. 1990); People v. Blanchette, 554 N.Y.S.2d 388 (City Ct. 1990). A fourth case, 
People v. Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d 612 (Sup. Ct. 1990), is unclear as to whether the constitutional 
claim adjudicated is a federal or state claim. A fifth case, Delano Village Cos. v. Orridge, 553 
N.Y.S.2d 938 (Sup. Ct. 1990), seems clearly to decide a free speech claim under the federal 
Constitution but is unclear about whether the ruling should also be understood as one under the 
state constitution. Also during 1990, the Court of Appeals decided 2 free speech claims under 
the state constitution. Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino, 564 N.E.2d 1046 (N.Y. 1990); 
Golden v. Clark, 564 N.E.2d 611 (N.Y. 1990). Research for this footnote was confined to pub-
lished decisions. 
83. Piesco v. City of New York, 753 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (retaliatory discharge); 
New York News, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 753 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (re-
stricting sale of newspapers); Levin v. Harleston, 752 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (academic 
freedom); Central Am. Refugee Ctr. v. City of Glen Cove, 753 F. Supp. 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(seeking employment); New York State Assn. of Career Schools v. State Educ. Dept., 749 F. 
Supp. 1264 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (regulation of schools); Uryevick v. Rozzi, 751 F. Supp. 1064 
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (employment rules); New Alliance Party v. Dinkins, 743 F. Supp. 1055 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (regulation of political party rally); Wojnarowicz v. American Family Assn., 
745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (state copyright law); Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 
F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (libel); New York State Natl. Org. for Women v. Terry, 737 F. 
Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (civil rights); Starace v. Chicago Tribune Co., 17 Media L. Rep. 
(BNA) 2330 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (libel); Selkirk v. Boyle, 738 F. Supp. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (public 
employment); Bardell v. General Elec. Co., 732 F. Supp. 327 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (workplace confl· 
dentiality); Saraceno v. City of Utica, 733 F. Supp. 538 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (retaliatory discharge); 
Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341(S.D.N.Y.1990) (regulation of beg-
ging). 
Again, research did not extend to unpublished district court opinions. Also excluded from 
this group are any cases that could not reasonably have been adjudicated in state court. For 
example, 14 cases in which the United States was a plaintiff or defendant have been excluded. 
84. This result is even more surprising given the New York Court of Appeals' explicit asser-
tion that the state constitution provides greater protection for free speech than the federal Consti-
tution. Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1277-78 (N.Y. 1991); O'Neitt v. 
Oakgrove Constr., 523 N.E.2d 277, 280 n.3 (N.Y. 1988). On the other hand, even when the 
court claims to expand constitutional protection, it seems to do so in a way that does not greatly 
assist the development of a state constitutional discourse. For example, the court has said that 
New York "has its own exceptional history and rich tradition" of freedom of the press, Immuno 
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3. Obscurity Concerning the Basis of Rulings 
One aspect of the grudging character of state constitutional deci-
sions discussed above is the failure of the court to specify whether its 
analyses and rulings relied on the state or federal constitutions. This 
obscurity is so prevalent, however, that it requires separate discussion. 
It has already been_ noted that a substantial proportion of the New 
York decisions share this flaw. The situation in other states is similar. 
In 29 cases decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
the court failed entirely to specify whether certain of the parties' 
claims, much less its own analysis and ruling, rested on state or federal 
constitutional grounds, or both. 85 For example, in Commonwealth v. 
Matthews, 86 the defendant claimed, according to the court, that the 
exclusion of certain jurors violated his "constitutional right to a ran-
dom selection of jurors from a fair cross-section of the community."87 
The court did not say whether the defendant's "constitutional right" 
was a state or federal one and, although it cited only Massachusetts 
AG., 561 N.E.2d at 1278, but it fails to define that history and tradition and to explain why they 
require results that differ from federal law. For a discussion of this assertion/counterassertion 
problem, see infra notes 141-50 and accompanying text. 
85. Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 563 N.E.2d 1367, 1369 (Mass. 1990) (inadequate assistance 
of counsel); Commonwealth v. Todd, 563 N.E.2d 211, 213 (Mass. 1990) (suppression of state-
ment); Strasnick v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 562 N.E.2d 1333, 1337-38 (Mass. 1990) 
(due process); Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 562 N.E.2d 797, 802-05 (Mass. 1990) (suppression 
of confession, suggestive identification); Commonwealth v. Rosado, 562 N.E.2d 790, 795-96 
(Mass. 1990) (inadequate assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. Colon, 558 N.E.2d 974, 979-
82 (Mass. 1990) (suppression of confession); Commonwealth v. Zagranski, 558 N.E.2d 933, 935 
(Mass. 1990) (probable cause); Commonwealth v. Tart, 557 N.E.2d 1123, 1130-31 (Mass. 1990) 
(self-incrimination); Commonwealth v. Moses, 557 N.E.2d 14, 16-18 (Mass. 1990) (stop and 
frisk); Commonwealth v. Bousquet, 556 N.E.2d 37, 41-43 (Mass. 1990) (suppression, inadequate 
assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. Dunn, 556 N.E.2d 30, 32-35 (Mass. 1990) (suppression 
issues); Luna v. Superior Court, 555 N.E.2d 881, 883 (Mass. 1990) (waiver of privilege against 
self-incrimination); Commonwealth v. Roberts, 555 N.E.2d 588, 589-90 (Mass. 1990) (suppres-
sion of defendant's statement); Commonwealth v. Pratt, 555 N.E.2d 559, 566-67 (Mass. 1990) 
(search warrant sufficiency); Commonwealth v. Perrot, 554 N.E.2d 1205 (Mass. 1990) (suppres-
sion issue); Commonwealth v. Downey, 553 N.E.2d 1303, 1307 (Mass. 1990) (suppression of 
pretrial identification); Richardson v. Sheriff of Middlesex County, 553 N.E.2d 1286, 1290-93 
(Mass. 1990) (prison conditions); Commonwealth v. Mamay, 553 N.E.2d 945, 952-53 (Mass. 
1990) (inadequate assistance of counsel); Care & Protection of Martha, 553 N.E.2d 902, 908 
(Mass. 1990) (due process); Commonwealth v. Couture, 552 N.E.2d 538, 539-40 (Mass. 1990) 
(probable cause); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 552 N.E.2d 101, 104-05 (Mass. 1990) (right to 
counsel); Commonwealth v. Robbins, 552 N.E.2d 77, 79-80 (Mass. 1990) (suppression in connec-
tion with search of auto; requires application of "constitutional principles"); Commonwealth v. 
Berrio, 551 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Mass. 1990) (due process); Commonwealth v. Davis, 551 N.E.2d 
39, 41-42 (Mass. 1990) (due process, equal protection); Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, 550 
N.E.2d 378, 382-83 (Mass. 1990) (adequacy of search warrant); Commonwealth v. Pope, 549 
N.E.2d 1120, 1126 n.8 (Mass. 1990) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. 
Bembury, 548 N.E.2d 1255, 1261-62 (Mass. 1990) (due process); Commonwealth v. Durning, 
548 N.E.2d 1242, 1247-48 (Mass. 1990) (due process); Commonwealth v. Matthews, 548 N.E.2d 
843, 848 (Mass. 1990) (right to jury representing fair cross-section of community). 
86. 548 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. 1990). 
87. 548 N.E.2d at 848. 
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cases in its analysis, gave no indication, such as a Long statement, that 
its analysis rested on state constitutional grounds. 
In 9 cases, the court went so far as to state explicitly that the liti-
gants were raising a claim under both the state and federal constitu-
tions, but then failed to specify the basis of its own analysis. 88 For 
example, Commonwealth v. Purdy 89 involved a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment claim under both the federal and state constitutions. In ruling 
on the claim, the court relied on one Massachusetts and one federal 
case, cited to neither the state nor federal constitution, and made no 
Long statement. It is thus impossible to tell whether this case should 
be considered part of state or federal constitutional discourse. 
The Virginia Supreme Court decided only 8 cases that can plausi-
bly be viewed as involving state constitutional issues.90 In 6 of these 
cases the court failed to specify whether its analysis dealt with the 
federal or state constitution. Typical is Brown v. Brown, 91 which dealt 
with an unidentified procedural due process issue. The courts of Loui-
siana92 and California93 also regularly failed to specify the basis of 
88. Commonwealth v. Scott, 564 N.E.2d 370, 374-75 (Mass. 1990) (right to exculpatory evi· 
dence); Commonwealth v. Purdy, 562 N.E.2d 1347, 1351-52 (Mass. 1990) (cruel and unusual 
punishment); Commonwealth v. Rosado, 562 N.E.2d 790, 794 (Mass. 1990) (right to speedy 
trial); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 553 N.E.2d 898 (Mass. 1990) (roadblock); Commonwealth v. 
Freeman, 552 N.E.2d 553, 555-57 (Mass. 1990) (due process/tainted grand jury); Common· 
wealth v. Rutkowski, 550 N.E.2d 362, 363-64 (Mass. 1990) (warrant description); Common· 
wealth v. Pope, 549 N.E.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Mass. 1990) (right to remain silent); Commonwealth 
v. Durning, 548 N.E.2d 1242, 1248-50 (Mass. 1990) (due process right to present a defense); 
Commonwealth v. Santoro, 548 N.E.2d 862, 863-64 (Mass. 1990) (standing to challenge search). 
89. 562 N.E.2d 1347 (Mass. 1990). 
90. Brown v. Brown, 397 S.E.2d 837, 839 (Va. 1990); Commonwealth v. Bums, 395 S.E.2d 
456, 458-460 (Va. 1990); Hamer v. School Board, 393 S.E.2d 623, 625-626 (Va. 1990); Hess v. 
Snyder Hunt Corp., 392 S.E.2d 817, 820-821(Va.1990); R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Committee 
for the Repeal of Ordinance R(C)-88-13, 391 S.E.2d 587, 591 (Va. 1990); Mu'min v. Common-
wealth, 389 S.E.2d 886, 890-891, 892-893 (Va. 1990); Smith v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 871, 
876 (Va. 1990); Occoquan Land Development Corp. v. Cooper, 389 S.E.2d 464, 467 (Va. 1990). 
Only in R.G. Moore and Hess did the court clearly state whether its analysis was based on the 
federal or state constitutions. 
91. 397 S.E.2d 837 (Va. 1990). 
92. Of 21 arguably relevant constitutional decisions, 9 (43%) failed to specify whether the 
constitution under discussion was the state or federal one. State v. Byrd, 568 So. 2d 554, 560-61 
(La. 1990) (scope of search warrant); State v. Roberts, 568 So. 2d 1017, 1019 (La. 1990) (due 
process/"fundamental fairness"); Louisiana State Bar Assn. v. Keys, 567 So. 2d 588, 591 (La. 
1990) (due process); Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Commn., 561 So. 2d 482, 491-96 (La. 1990) 
(due process); State v. Burrell, 561 So. 2d 692, 698-99 (La. 1990) (fair trial/change of venue), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 799 (1991); State v. Wille, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1335-36, 1338-39 (La. 1990) 
(vagueness, ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Lee, 559 So. 2d 1310, 1313-15 (La. 1990) 
(exclusion of blacks from venire); State v. Jones, 558 So. 2d 546, 551-52 (La. 1990) (vagueness); 
Caracci v. Louisiana State Racing Commn., 556 So. 2d 1249 (La. 1990) (due process). 
93. Almost all of the 36 decisions rendered by the California Supreme Court in 1990 that 
handled state constitutional issues were death penalty appeals. While the death penalty review 
cases of the California Supreme Court are noteworthy for their clarity and thoroughness, the 
court still issued 23 opinions in which at least one constitutional issue was analyzed without any 
indication of whether the constitutional analysis was based on the federal or state constitution. 
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their constitutional rulings, although to a somewhat lesser extent. 
The Kansas Supreme Court has raised ambiguity about the consti-
tutional basis of judicial rulings to something of an art form. In 13 out 
of 21 relevant cases, the court referred to some sort of constitutional 
right without specifying its source.94 To further confuse things, in 6 
cases the court held opaquely that it "adopted" the relevant federal 
standard.95 For example, in State v. Prewett96 the court discussed a 
People v. Hayes, 802 P.2d 376, 393, 397, 398, 401, 402, 413-15 (Cal. 1990) (ineffective assistance 
of counsel), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3359 (1991); People v. Benson, 802 P.2d 330, 353-57 (Cal. 
1990) (prosecutorial misconduct), cert. denied, 116 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1991); People v. Kaurish, 802 
P.2d 278, 289-90, 305-06 (Cal. 1990) (prosecutorial misconduct, inadequate assistance of counsel, 
equal protection), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 121 (1991); People v. Gallego, 802 P.2d 169, 188-89, 
192-93, 204-06 (Cal. 1990) (waiver of counsel, venue/fair trial, prosecutorial misconduct), cert 
denied, 116 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1991); People v. Anderson, 801 P.2d 1107, 1112-14, 1116-18 (Cal. 
1990) (dilution of juror sense of responsibility, prosecutorial misconduct), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
148 (1991); People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1202-03 (Cal. 1990) (ineffective assistance of 
counsel), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 117 (1991); In re Crooks, 800 P.2d 898 (Cal. 1990)(due process, 
double jeopardy); People v. Ortiz, 800 P.2d 547, 552, 555-56 (Cal. 1990) (right to counsel, due 
process); People v. Kelly, 800 P.2d 516, 530-31, 533-34, 537-39 (Cal. 1990) (venue/fair trial, 
juror bias, prosecutorial misconduct), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 117 (1991); People v. Medina, 799 
P.2d 1282, 1297-99, 1303 (Cal. 1990) (prosecutorial misconduct, "right to be personally pres-
ent"), cert. granted in part and motion granted, 116 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1991); People v. Frank, 798 
P.2d 1215, 1221, 1223, 1225-26 (Cal. 1990) (double jeopardy, ineffective assistance of counsel, 
prosecutorial misconduct), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2816 (1991); People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 
580-81 (Cal. 1990) (due process), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2249 (1991); People v. Rodriguez, 795 
P.2d 783 (Cal. 1990) (due process); People v. Stankewitz, 793 P.2d 23, 43-44, 45, 50-53 (Cal. 
1990) (juror bias, discriminatory peremptory challenges, ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1432 (1991); People v. Gordon, 792 P.2d 251, 263-64, 271 (Cal. 1990) (fair 
trial, prosecutorial misconduct), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1123 (1991); People v. Ramirez, 791 
P.2d 965, 981, 984-85 (Cal. 1990) (waiver of right to cross-examination, ineffective assistance of 
counsel), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1025 (1991); Dahlman v. State Bar, 790 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Cal. 
1990) (due process); People v. Miller, 790 P.2d 1289, 1314-15, 1317-18 (Cal. 1990) (prosecutorial 
misconduct, unfair trial), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 713 (1991); People v. Mattson, 789 P.2d 983, 
1017-18 (Cal.) (ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 591 (1990); People v. 
Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 135-36, 158-59 (Cal.) (voir dire/juror bias, prosecutorial misconduct), mod-
ified, 50 Cal. 3d 1157a, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 442 (1990); People v. Douglas, 788 P.2d 640, 651-
53, 674-75, 682 (Cal. 1990) (fair trial, double jeopardy, ineffective assistance of counsel); People 
v. Lewis, 786 P.2d 892, 907-08 (Cal. 1990) (ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. Thomp-
son, 785 P.2d 857, 874-77 (Cal.) (voluntariness of confession), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 226 (1990). 
94. State v. White, 785 P.2d 950, 954, 956 (Kan. 1990) (coerced confession; harmless error); 
State v. Pioletti, 785 P.2d 963, 975, 976 (Kan. 1990) (double jeopardy; prosecutorial miscon-
duct); State v. Graham, 799 P.2d 1003 (Kan. 1990) (admissibility of statements); State v. Wes-
son, 802 P.2d 574, 581(Kan.1990) (double jeopardy), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2866 (1991); State 
v. Weis, 792 P.2d 989, 991, 992 (Kan. 1990) (seizure); State v. Alires, 792 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Kan. 
1990) (suggestive identification); State v. Searles, 793 P.2d 724, 728, 732, 733 (Kan. 1990) (due 
process; double jeopardy); State v. Probst, 795 P.2d 393 (Kan. 1990) (suppression issue); State v. 
Bailey, 799 P.2d 977 (Kan. 1990) (validity of stop); State v. Prewett, 785 P.2d 956, 961 (Kan. 
1990) (suppression); State v. Toler, 787 P.2d 711, 714, 715 (Kan. 1990) (warrant validity); State 
v. Jones, 787 P.2d 726, 727 (Kan. 1990) (admissibility of statement); State v. Massey, 795 P.2d 
344, 348 (Kan. 1990) (representative jury). 
95. State v. Smith, 799 P.2d 497, 501 (Kan. 1990); State v. Massey, 795 P.2d 344, 348 (Kan. 
1990); State v. Searles, 793 P.2d 724, 728 (Kan. 1990); State v. Jones, 787 P.2d 726, 728 (Kan. 
1990); State v. Toler, 787 P.2d 711, 716 (Kan. 1990); State v. Prewett, 785 P.2d 956, 961 (Kan. 
1990). 
96. 785 P.2d 956 (Kan. 1990). 
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rule announced by the U.S. Supreme Court under the Fourth Amend-
ment, and then said that the standard so announced "has been ap-
proved by this court. "97 Otherwise, the case contains no indication as 
to whether the ruling is one under the state or federal constitution, or 
both. Of course, one might speculate that the court would have no 
reason to "approve" a U.S. Supreme Court standard if it were merely 
applying binding federal law, so the use of this language demonstrates 
the state constitutional basis of the holding. Things are not that clear, 
however. The court in Prewett nowhere mentioned the state constitu-
tion, nor did it make any Michigan v. Long statement, or use any other 
kind of language that could be construed as an attempt to insulate the 
decision from further review. Moreover, although the court cited one 
of its previous decisions to support its contention that it had adopted 
the federal standard, that case contains precisely the same ambiguity 
concerning the basis of the court's ruling as Prewett itself.98 
4. Lockstep Analysis 
One reason state courts may fail to specify when constitutional rul-
ings rest on state or federal grounds is that it so often seems not to 
matter because the two documents have exactly the same meaning -
they have been interpreted in what is sometimes called "lockstep."99 
For example, in 11 of the 22 Massachusetts cases in which litigants 
raised both state and federal constitutional claims, the court held that 
the relevant analysis and result were the same under both constitu-
tions on the facts of the case. Thus, the constitutional standards that 
will be applied in Massachusetts to some types of due process, 100 fair 
trial, 101 use immunity, 102 and ineffective assistance of counsel 
97. 785 P.2d at 961. 
98. State v. Walter, 670 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Kan. 1983). To make matters worse, Walter refers 
approvingly to a prior Kansas lower court decision "adopting" the federal rule. State v. Rose, 
665 P.2d 1111 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983). That case, apparently the source of the chain of ambiguity 
in this line of cases, describes the reason for its ruling as follows: 
We have no reason to believe the Kansas Supreme Court would •.• hold that the Kansas 
Constitution requires Kansas to adopt a rule similar to that in [prior U.S. Supreme Court 
cases]. Thus, all prior Kansas decisions ••• inconsistent with [a very recent Supreme Court 
case that modified the rule announced in the prior cases] will no longer be followed by this 
court. 
665 P.2d at 1115. It is still unclear from this statement whether Rose is a decision under the 
federal or state constitution, or both. 
99. See Brennan, Bill of Rights, supra note 1, at 550-51; Maltz, supra note 38. 
100. Care and Protection of Robert, 556 N.E.2d 993 (Mass. 1990) (standard of proof for loss 
of custody); Opinion of the Justices, 563 N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1990) (protection of property 
interests). 
101. Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 557 N.E.2d 728 (Mass. 1990) (right to present evidence). 
102. Commonwealth v. Kerr, 563 N.E.2d 1364 (Mass. 1990). 
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claims, 103 as well as to a wide variety of search and seizure issues, 104 
are identical under the state and federal constitutions. Moreover, in 
another 5 cases adjudicating claims relying solely on the state constitu-
tion, the court nevertheless looked to federal law for guidance, and 
applied an analysis used by federal courts under the federal Constitu-
tion.105 These cases suggest that participants in the Massachusetts 
legal system, including the Supreme Judicial Court, have no particular 
need to distinguish clearly between the state and federal constitutions, 
because the two documents to a large extent have the same meaning 
and can thus be used interchangeably. 
Much the same is true in other states. In the only 2 Virginia cases 
explicitly presenting alternative claims under the federal and state con-
stitutions, the court held that the same result obtained under the fed-
eral and state constitutions.106 Similarly, in 6 Louisiana cases where 
state and federal constitutional claims were raised separately, the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court held that the relevant analysis and the outcome 
were the same under both constitutions.107 
California presents an interesting example of the tendency to inter-
pret state and federal constitutions in lockstep. The California Consti-
tution provides: "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not 
dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution."108 
This provision stands as an open invitation to the development of an 
independent state constitutional jurisprudence. In 1990, there was no 
sign that this invitation had been taken up: in 14 of the 15 cases where 
litigants raised both state and federal constitutional challenges to the 
same government action, the court reached precisely the same result 
103. Commonwealth v. Cardenuto, 548 N.E.2d 864 (Mass. 1990). 
104. Commonwealth v. Wunder, 556 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1990) (probable cause); Common-
wealth v. Cast, 556 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990) (exception to warrant requirement); Commonwealth 
v. Moses, 557 N.E.2d 14 (Mass. 1990) (stop and frisk); Commonwealth v. Tart, 557 N.E.2d 1123 
(Mass. 1990) (warrantless administrative search involving request to produce state permit); Com-
monwealth v. Price, 562 N.E.2d 1355 (Mass. 1990) (standing to challenge search). 
105. Commonwealth v. Allen, 549 N.E.2d 430 (Mass. 1990) (probable cause); Common-
wealth v. Melendez, 551 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1990) (suppression); Commonwealth v. Bray, 553 
N.E.2d 538 (Mass. 1990) (retroactivity of decision for purposes of jury instruction); O'Connor v. 
Police Commr., 557 N.E.2d 1146 (Mass. 1990) (urinalysis); Gauthier v. Police Commr., 557 
N.E.2d 1374 (Mass. 1990) (urinalysis). 
106. Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp., 392 S.E.2d 817 (Va. 1990); R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 
Committee for the Repeal of Ordinance R(C)-88-13, 391 S.E.2d 587 (Va. 1990). 
107. Moresi v. Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990) (existence 
of civil damages action directly under state constitution for unconstitutional searches and 
seizures); Paillet v. Wooton, 559 So. 2d 758 (La. 1990) (procedural due process); State in Interest 
of J.A.V., 558 So. 2d 214 (La. 1990) (due process/statutory vagueness); State ex rel. Adams v. 
Butler, 558 So. 2d 552 (La. 1990) (double jeopardy); Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. 
Serv. Commn., 556 So. 2d 573 (La. 1990) (due process); In re Adoption ofB.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545 
(La. 1990) (due process). 
108. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24. 
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under both constitutions. This constitutional congruity extended to 
issues involving the right to a public trial, 109 the disproportionality of 
a death sentence, 11o the right to a representative jury, 111 juror bias re-
garding the death penalty, 112 the right to counsel, 113 suppression of 
involuntary confessions, 114 inadequate assistance of counsel, 115 due 
process rights,116 the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges,117 
and the right to confront witnesses.118 In 5 additional cases, the court 
held the state and federal constitutions to have identical meanings by 
force of the operation of California's Proposition 8, a constitutional 
amendment dramatically limiting the scope of the state's exclusionary 
rule.119 
109. People v. Thompson, 785 P.2d 857, 867-68 (Cal. 1990). 
110. People v. Turner, 789 P.2d 887, 916 (Cal. 1990); People v. Marshall, 790 P.2d 676, 691-
92 (Cal. 1990). 
111. People v. Mattson, 789 P.2d 983, 994-95 (Cal. 1990); People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 
569 (Cal. 1990). 
112. Mattson, 789 P.2d at 995-97; Sanders, 797 P.2d at 577. 
113. Mattson, 789 P.2d at 1011-13. 
114. Marshal/, 790 P.2d at 683; People v. Benson, 802 P.2d 330, 343 (Cal. 1990); People v. 
Gallego, 802 P.2d 169, 201-02 (Cal. 1990). The last case was a pre-Proposition 8 case, so the 
court held that the state and federal constitutions required the same result on the facts of the case 
even before Proposition 8 intervened to prevent such an analysis. See infra note 119. 
115. Marshal/, 790 P.2d at 698-99; In re Fields, 800 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1990). 
116. People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1172-73 (Cal. 1990); People v. Medina, 799 P.2d 
1282, 1288-91 (Cal. 1990); People v. Frank, 798 P.2d 1215 (Cal. 1990); San Diego County Dept. 
of Social Servs. v. Russell S., 795 P.2d 1244, 1251-53 (Cal. 1990); People v. Jones, 792 P.2d 643, 
656-58 (Cal. 1990). 
117. People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 574 (Cal. 1990); People v. Hayes, 802 P.2d 376, 391-92 
(Cal. 1990). 
118. Frank, 798 P.2d at 1221. 
119. People v. Thompson, 785 P.2d 857, 874 (Cal. 1990); People v. Luttenberger, 784 P.2d 
633, 639 (Cal. 1990); People v. Prather, 787 P.2d 1012 (Cal. 1990); People v. Douglas, 788 P.2d 
640, 654-55 (Cal. 1990); People v. Kelly, 800 P.2d 516, 525-30 (Cal. 1990). Although the results 
in these cases may be correct, the court's reasoning is almost certainly wrong, and illustrates the 
degree to which the current California Supreme Court has become attached to federal constitu-
tional law. 
Proposition 8, also known as the Victims' Bill of Rights, Prather, 787 P.2d at 1014, was 
adopted by initiative in 1982. The provision quite simply forbids the exclusion of "relevant evi-
dence" in criminal cases, CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 28(d); it is, in essence, a constitutional repeal of 
the state's exclusionary rule. See Wilkes, supra note 6 (arguing that state constitutional amend-
ment process has been used to limit the state constitutional rights of criminal defendants). or 
course, so long as the federal Constitution forbids the introduction of some types of evidence, not 
all evidence of guilt will be admitted, but such exclusions will be the result of federal, not state 
constitutional restrictions. 
Rather than interpreting the proposition to sweep away the exclusionary rule as a matter of 
state law - its obvious purpose - the court has interpreted it to cut down state constitutional 
protections only as far as the minimum level of federal protections. In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 
(Cal. 1985); People v. Luttenberger, 784 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1990). While this will of course be the 
practical result of any case in which a defendant invokes the exclusionary rule as a matter of state 
and federal constitutional law, such a result should come about not because both constitutions 
provide the same protection but because the state constitution provides none and the federal 
Constitution sets a mandatory floor by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Collins, 
supra note 25, at 15 ("There is no constitutional impediment preventing state courts from grant-
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Like ambiguity regarding the basis of a constitutional ruling, lock-
step analysis of the state constitution discourages the development of 
an independent state constitutional discourse. First, it discourages 
participants in the legal system from making arguments ·clearly and 
distinctly based on the state constitution by reducing the potential 
benefit from effort invested in developing such an argument. Indeed, 
because the federal Constitution is generally more fully elaborated 
than its state counterparts, lockstep analysis tends to elevate federal 
law into the law of choice for the interpretation of the state constitu-
tion; it provides a generous source of off-the-shelf standards and analy-
ses for application to state constitutional problems. Second, lockstep 
analysis is conducive to the perception that the state constitution is 
some sort of redundancy - that it is a source of law that has no par-
ticular value or purpose and therefore need not be taken seriously. 
When state constitutional arguments come to be seen as "garbage ar-
guments," 120 the likelihood that litigants or courts will devote much 
attention to the state constitution is drastically reduced. 
Nevertheless, the mere congruity of state and federal constitutional 
outcomes need not by itself produce these results. The wording of 
many state constitutional provisions is identical to or closely approxi-
mates the wording of corresponding federal provisions, and the histor-
ical roots of state constitutions often intertwine with those of the 
national document; as Chief Justice David Brock of the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court has noted, certain striking similarities between 
the construction given the state and federal constitutions are "logical, 
given their common ancestry."121 In these circumstances, it might 
well be unremarkable if state and federal constitutional law overlapped 
to a considerable extent. This possibility underlies in part the appeal 
of the interstitial approach to state constitutional interpretation: be-
cause there is a strong likelihood of doctrinal similarity, it is argued, 
courts should start with the federal analysis and deviate from it only 
ing a lesser degree of protection under state [constitutional] law, provided only that these courts 
then ... apply ... the federal Constitution ••.. "). What the court seems to forget is that it is 
permissible in our system for a state constitution to provide less protection than the U.S. Consti-
tution, as well as more. Indeed, the only case the court decided in 1990 in which it held the state 
constitution to provide broader protections than the federal Constitution involved application of 
standards that preceded the adoption of Proposition 8, and which no longer apply in California. 
People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1169 n.3 (Cal. 1990). 
120. Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1162 (quoting Eric Klumb, Comment, The Independent 
Application of State Constitutional Provisions to Questions of Criminal Procedure, 62 MARQ. L. 
REV. 596, 620 n.145 (1979)). 
121. State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 720 (N.H. 1990) (Brock, C.J., concurring); see also 
Kaye, supra note 5, at 412 ("Common objectives, common drafters and common models natu-
rally engender common texts."). 
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for clearly defined reasons.122 Yet not even devotees of the interstitial 
approach suggest that state courts should indiscriminately copy fed-
eral analysis into state constitutional law. If state deviations from fed-
eral constitutional law may be justified only by textual, historical, or 
political factors specific to the state constitution, 123 it follows that doc-
trinal similarities must be justified by the absence of such factors. 
Thus, it is not necessarily lockstep interpretation itself that suppresses 
state constitutional discourse so much as unexplained lockstep 
interpretation. 
Do state courts explain adequately the reasons for lockstep rul-
ings? I suspect that by now the reader will be unsurprised to learn 
that they do not; in fact, state courts almost never explain the basis for 
lockstep rulings. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court did not 
explain the congruity of outcomes in the 2 lockstep cases it decided, 
except to assert in one case that "we refuse to give any broader inter-
pretation" to the state constitution's due process guarantee. 124 The 
Kansas Supreme Court decided 4 cases in lockstep with federal consti-
tutional law;125 in none of these cases did the court say much more 
than that the state constitution affords "the same protections" as, 126 or 
is "identical in scope" to, 127 the federal Constitution. The situation 
was much the same in New York. In People v. Hernandez, 128 for ex-
ample, the court held that the federal and state equal protection 
clauses produced the same result; the court's only explanation for this 
congruity was its assertion, without further elaboration, that "no justi-
fication for breaking new ground as to [the state] clause ... is suffi-
ciently advanced."129 
These conclusory rulings do not provide participants in the legal 
system with any way to recognize situations in which the state consti-
tution should be understood to be similar to the federal Constitution. 
The litigant who asks why the two documents have the same meaning 
in a particular case is told by the court, in effect, "they just do." Such 
122. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. 
123. See Pollock, supra note 2, at 718-19. 
124. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Committee for the Repeal of Ordinance R(C)-88-13, 391 
S.E.2d 587, 591 (Va. 1990). 
125. State v. Wesson, 802 P.2d 574 (Kan. 1990); Love v. One 1967 Chevrolet El Camino, 799 
P.2d 1043 (Kan. 1990); State v. Hall, 793 P.2d 737 (Kan. 1990); In re Lucas, 789 P.2d 1157 
(Kan. 1990). 
126. Lucas, 189 P.2d at 1160. 
127. Love, 199 P.2d at 1048. 
128. 552 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 1990). 
129. 552 N.E.2d at 624. 
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a response makes any kind of further debate about the relative mean-
ings of the state and federal constitutions a virtual impossibility. 
5. Silence on State Constitutional History 
If state constitutional law lacks a discourse of constitutional simi-
. larity, it also largely lacks a discourse of constitutional distinctness, 
something that members of the interstitial school of New Federalism 
hold to be a requirement of proper state constitutional adjudication.130 
For example, state constitutional history is a factor often cited as a 
legitimate basis for interpreting state constitutional provisions differ-
ently from their federal counterparts, yet state courts almost never re-
sort to the state's constitutional history in the way that federal courts 
routinely do. 
Consider the Massachusetts Constitution, which dates to 1780 and 
is the oldest continually operative constitution in the United States.131 
The state constitution was drafted primarily by John Adams, a pivotal 
figure in the nation's founding, and the author of a treatise on consti-
tutional law that heavily influenced thinking about constitutions dur-
ing the period following independence.132 One might expect Adams' 
views to play a pivotal role in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court's constitutional jurisprudence, and to furnish the basis for diver-
gent interpretations of the state constitution to the extent that Adams' 
views differed from those of the federal Constitution's Framers. Yet 
the court has almost never mentioned Adams for any purpose; 133 in-
deed, one would never know from reading the court's decisions that 
the Massachusetts Constitution had any kind of history at all. 134 
As with Massachusetts, the Virginia court has been strangely silent 
on the state's constitutional history. The Virginia Declaration of 
130. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
131. Sturm, supra note 69, at 75. 
132. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787, at 567-68 (1969). 
133. A computer search of Supreme Judi~ial Court decisions, unrestricted by date, revealed 
only six cases in which the court mentioned John Adams, and in most of these the mention is 
peripheral to resolution of the case. See Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 441 N.E.2d 725, 742 
(Mass. 1982) (concurring opinion), revd. sub nom. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 
(1984); Commonwealth v. St. Germain, 408 N.E.2d 1358, 1366 n.18 (Mass. 1980); Common-
wealth v. Cundriff', 415 N.E.2d 172, 177 (Mass. 1980); Opinion of the Justices, 309 N.E.2d 476, 
480 n.5 (Mass. 1974); Opinion of the Justices, 271 N.E.2d 335, 341 (Mass. 1971); Parker v. 
Simpson, 62 N.E. 401, 407 (1902). 
134. In addition to the paucity of references to John Adams, a computer search of Supreme 
Judicial Court decisions, unrestricted by date, revealed that the court has never mentioned El-
bridge Gerry or Rufus King, and has mentioned Samuel Adams only once. Commonwealth v. 
Nissenbaum, 536 N.E.2d 592, 596 n.5 (Mass. 1989). All were leading figures during the found-
ing period and signers of the Declaration of Independence or federal Constitution. 
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Rights was drafted by George Mason, and James Madison later used it 
as a model for the federal Bill of Rights. One might think that Ma-
son's views would carry some weight in Virginia's construction of its 
own Declaration of Rights, yet the Virginia Supreme Court appears to 
have consulted Mason's views only once since 1925135 - far fewer 
times than the U.S. Supreme Court has turned to Mason. 136 Thomas 
Jefferson's name is similarly missing from the Virginia Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence.137 Like Sherlock Holmes' dog that did not 
bark in the night, 138 the court's silence seems significant; the court 
treats the state constitution, when it treats it at all, like some kind of 
ahistorical, authorless text. 139 In so doing, it limits greatly the avail-
able ways of talking about the state constitution, thus constraining the 
scope of any potential state constitutional discourse. 140 
Similarly, Louisiana possesses a unique Spanish and French heri-
tage that could easily account for potentially significant differences be-
tween the state and federal constitutions, especially given that it 
accounts for Louisiana's adherence to the civil law rather than the 
common law, a feature of the legal landscape shared by no other 
American state. But the constitutional decisions of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court give no hint of this unique historical and legal back-
ground. Nor is there anything in California state constitutional rul-
ings to suggest that the state was settled under frontier conditions that 
differed, perhaps significantly, from the conditions under which east-
ern seaboard states were founded. In short, the state constitutional 
discourse of distinctness predicted by New Federalism has largely 
failed to materialize. 
B. Exceptions 
Although the general trends in state constitutional law contradict 
the claims of New Federalism, proponents of New Federalism might 
135. Reid v. Gholson, 327 S.E.2d 107, 112 n.10 (Va. 1985). This reference was found by 
performing a computer search, unrestricted by date, of the opinions of the Virginia Supreme 
Court contained in a database that includes opinions going back to 1925. 
136. Among the many such decisions, see, for example, Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways & 
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483 (1987); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 n.10 (1983); Mc· 
Daniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 n.9 (1978); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 n.28 (1973). 
137. An unrestricted computer search of Virginia high court decisions turned up only one 
relevant reference, and a minor one at that. See Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (Va. 
1985) (quoting one short passage from Jefferson's first inaugural address). 
138. Pace Marshall J. Tinkle, State Constitutional Law in Maine: At the Crossroads, 13 VT. 
L. REv. 61, 67 (1988). 
139. I am indebted to my colleague Don Korobkin for this observation. 
140. Cf. supra note 69. 
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take comfort from a few exceptions, which I re'view here for that rea-
son. Occasionally, state courts do diverge from federal law or engage 
in independent state constitutional analysis. However, even these ex-
ceptions often tum out on closer examination to represent less of a 
departure from the general trends than seems apparent at first glance. 
1. Divergences from Federal Law 
State courts of course do not always interpret the state constitution 
in lockstep with federal law; occasionally they strike out on their own, 
a development that New Federalism advocates generally applaud. 141 
The sample surveyed here contains several examples of such diver-
gences. However, the existence of divergent holdings does not neces-
sarily indicate a healthy state constitutional discourse. 
Let us return to New York, which again is fairly representative of 
the sample states as a group. In 1990, the New York Court of Appeals 
held in 4 cases that the state constitution provides greater protection 
of individual rights than does the federal Constitution.142 Consider 
People v. Dunn. 143 There, a criminal defendant challenged a search 
under the state and federal constitutions. The court began its opinion 
by analyzing the claim under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution, and held that no search had occurred as a matter of federal 
constitutional law.144 Apparently following a more or less interstitial 
approach, the court then turned explicitly to the state constitutional 
claim. So far, so good; the court's analysis is systeµiatic, and would 
clearly be insulated from Supreme Court review under Michigan v. 
Long. 
The court framed the relevant state constitutional question as 
whether it should adopt as a matter of state constitutional law the 
analysis of the controlling federal case.145 The court then pointed out 
that it had interpreted the state constitution independently from the 
federal Constitution in the past, and concluded that it would do so 
141. See supra note SS and accompanying text. The existence of state decisions that diverge 
from federal Jaw seems to be considered a major empirical indicator of state court independence. 
142. People v. Dunn, S64 N.E.2d 10S4 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Van Pelt, SS6 N.E.2d 423 
(N.Y. 1990); People v. Vilardi, SSS N.E.2d 91S (N.Y. 1990); People v. Davis, SS3 N.E.2d 1008 
(N.Y. 1990). 
143. S64 N.E.2d 10S4 (N.Y. 1990). 
144. S64 N.E.2d at 10S6-S7. 
14S. S64 N.E.2d at 10S7. This approach should not be confused with a proper interstitial 
approach to state constitutional interpretation. Proponents of the interstitial approach do not 
suggest that state courts decide whether a federal rule should be adopted as the state law based 
on the merits of the federal rule; rather, they urge state courts to adopt whatever rule an in-
dependent construction of the state constitution requires, but to do so only when required to 
reach the state constitutional issue. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. 
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again here. 146 The heart of its analysis is contained in a footnote. 
"Unlike the Supreme Court," the New York court thought the analy-
sis under the state constitution should have a different "focus" from 
controlling Fourth Amendment precedent.147 The proper focus, it 
said, was contained in a particular federal circuit court opinion which 
the New York court found "persuasive."148 However, the court in no 
way explained what about this case was persuasive, or why a federal 
court discussing the federal Constitution should be understood to be 
saying anything persuasive about the New York Constitution. The 
New York court went on to cite a dissenting Supreme Court opinion 
by Justice Brennan, as well as some previously decided New York 
cases, before concluding that a search had occurred under the state 
constitutional standard, although the defendant's state constitutional 
rights had not been violated by that search.149 
Consider this case for a moment from the perspective of state con-
stitutional discourse. Suppose you are a criminal defense lawyer. 
Your client was arrested by New York police as the result of a search 
that is factually distinguishable from the circumstances of Dunn. You 
want to move to suppress the fruits of the search, and you are quite 
certain that such a motion will fail under controlling Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting the Fourth Amendment. When you bring the 
motion, you therefore include a claim under the New York Constitu-
tion which, you argue, provides broader protections to criminal de-
fendants than the Fourth Amendment. In light of Dunn, what kind of 
an argument can you craft? 
Certainly you cannot use Dunn to support any kind of argument 
suggesting that differences in the text, framers' intent, or founding his-
tory of the state constitution justify a different result. Indeed, as far as 
appears from Dunn, such arguments have not the slightest currency 
with the Court of Appeals. You can perhaps imitate the winning ap-
proach in Dunn by finding old federal lower court cases that went 
your way before the Supreme Court ruled against the position you 
advocate, and you may find good language from the dissenters in the 
relevant Supreme Court cases - but what can you say about these 
rulings? That they are "persuasive"? Suppose the prosecutor says:' 
"No, they're not persuasive. The majority Supreme Court opinion is 
much more persuasive." How can you respond? 
The truth is, you cannot respond. Although Dunn provides you 
146. 564 N.E.2d at 1057. 
147. 564 N.E.2d at 1057-58. 
148. 564 N.E.2d at 1058 n.4. 
149. 564 N.E.2d at 1058. 
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with plenty of ideas for assertions, it provides nothing useful for argu-
ment. You can assert that the state constitution is more protective 
than the Fourth Amendment; you can assert that the New York 
courts have been willing to depart from federal analyses in the past; 
you can assert that some case favorable to you is persuasive; but you 
can neither back up these assertions with arguments if challenged, nor 
explain why the assertions are relevant to and properly describe your 
particular case. At bottom, Dunn furnishes the litigant with no lan-
guage in which to engage in intelligible debate with an opponent or 
with a judge over the meaning of the state constitution. At best, the 
participants who want to engage in such a debate - and a criminal 
defendant may want desperately to do so - can make a series of 
counterassertions about the meaning of the constitution. But an ex-
change of conflicting assertions about the constitution does not 
amount to a meaningful constitutional discourse.150 
The situation is much the same in Massachusetts. Although the 
Supreme Judicial Court decided 3 cases in 1990 holding that the state 
constitution provides broader protection of individual rights than the 
federal Constitution, 151 its opinions reveal no intelligible discourse of 
distinctness on which litigants could rely in order to build effective 
arguments concerning the ways in which the state and federal consti-
tutions differ. 
For example, in Commonwealth v. Amendola, 152 the court adopted 
as a matter of state constitutional law the federal Fourth Amendment 
automatic standing rule, a rule that the U.S. Supreme Court an-
nounced in a 1960 case,153 but recently abandoned.154 The court's 
only explanation for departing from what appears to be its usual prac-
tice of following current federal Fourth Amendment law was that the 
concerns of the earlier Supreme Court decision "remain valid today, 
150. To like effect is People v. Davis, 553 N.E.2d 1008 (N.Y. 1990), another case in which 
the court diverged from federal holdings. There, the court considered a right to counsel claim 
under the state and federal constitutions. Although the court held that the New York constitu-
tion provided broader protection than the federal, and cited contrasting state and federal cases to 
prove it, the court never said why or in what way the state constitution provided enhanced 
protection. 553 N.E.2d at 1010-11. Rather, it simply concluded that the case should come out in 
a certain way, which is to say that it made an assertion of its own, unsupported by the elements 
of constitutional discourse to which other participants in the legal system might be able to re-
spond intelligibly. 553 N.E.2d at 1011-13. 
151. Commonwealth v. Amendola, 550 N.E.2d 121 (Mass. 1990); Commonwealth v. 
Melendez, 551 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1990); Commonwealth v. Lyons, 564 N.E.2d 390 (Mass. 
1990). 
152. 550 N.E.2d 121 (Mass. 1990). 
153. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
154. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
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despite the current Supreme Court's shift in thinking."155 This ruling 
prompted a dissent from Justice Nolan, who criticized the court for 
departing from settled federal law "without so much as a plausible 
argument that the Massachusetts Constitution requires the 
expansion."156 
Amendola provides little basis for participants in the Massachu-
setts legal system to do much more than make assertions and counter-
assertions about the meaning of the state constitution; it does not 
contribute meaningfully to any discourse of constitutional distinctness. 
And even if the comes language about the "concerns" of a prior fed-
eral decision could be parlayed into some kind of debate, there is nev-
ertheless a distinctly hit-or-miss feeling to the court's decisions on 
whether to adhere to or depart from federal holdings. Thus, in Com-
monwealth v. Cote, 157 the court said in response to a claim of state 
constitutional distinctness that the state constitution may "afford more 
substantive protection" than the federal Constitution, 158 and found 
that the issue under scrutiny raised "a closer question" under the state 
constitution than under the federal, but ended up rejecting the claim of 
distinctness without any useful explanation.159 Likewise, in Common-
wealth v. Cast, 160 the court acknowledged that the state constitution 
provided "greater protection against unlawful search and seizure" 
than its federal counterpart, but held against the defendant anyway 
because the defendant had offered no reason to support his contention 
that more protection should be available on the facts of the particular 
case.161 
Again, these cases are virtually useless from the perspective of 
state constitutional discourse. There is really no plausible way to look 
at Amendola, Cote, and Cast and build any kind of intelligible argu-
ment about why the Massachusetts Constitution required a departure 
from the federal approach in one but not the others. Prosecutors and 
defense counsel can use these cases only to contradict each other, not 
to debate the meaning of the state constitution. 
lSS. SSO N.E.2d at 12S. 
1S6. SSO N.E.2d at 127. 
1S7. SS6 N.E.2d 4S (Mass. 1990). 
1S8. SS6 N.E.2d at SO (quoting Commonwealth v. Blood, S07·N.E.2d 1029, 1033 n.9 (Mass. 
1987)). 
1S9. SS6 N.E.2d at SO. 
160. SS6 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990). 
161. SS6 N.E.2d at 79, 79-80. 
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2. Independent Analysis 
The cases that most closely support the claims of New Federalism 
are those in which state courts engaged in true independent analysis of 
the state constitution using the traditional tools of constitutional inter-
pretation. A potentially promising bright spot is Louisiana, where in a 
substantial minority of cases the Louisiana Supreme Court ap-
proached state constitutional questions more systematically and thor-
oughly than the cases discussed above. In 8 1990 cases - nearly 40% 
of the total state constitutional cases decided - the court seemed no-
ticeably more willing not only to acknowledge that it was being asked 
by litigants to construe the state constitution, but actually to honor the 
request. 162 The cases in this subset of the court's decisions are not 
always as thorough or as systematic as they could be, nor do they 
generally contain the type of Long language necessary to insulate them 
from further review. Nevertheless, the tone of these opinions suggests 
that the Louisiana Supreme Court will take state constitutional claims 
seriously at least some of the time. 
For example, in Department of Transportation and Development v. 
Dietrich, 163 the court considered a question arising under the eminent 
domain provisions of the state constitution. Although the court's 
analysis was brief, it included consideration of the text of the relevant 
provision of the 1974 constitution, that provision's predecessor in the 
previous constitution, and some judicial precedent relevant to the con-
struction of the provision.164 Dietrich thus provides some guidance to 
participants in the legal system concerning the proper way to talk 
about the meaning of the constitution; presumably, a litigant will be 
able in a future case to craft an argument, if one is available, based on 
the text of a provision of the current constitution and its counterpart 
in the previous constitution. 
In 3 other cases from this group, the court performed something 
like the type of analysis one might expect to find in a robust constitu-
tional discourse, discussing the text and history of constitutional pro-
visions, the structure of the state constitution, prior state judicial 
162. State v. Miller, 571 So. 2d 603 (La. 1990) (double jeopardy); Moresi v. Department of 
Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990) (civil remedies for unconstitutional search and 
seizure); Moore v. Roemer, 567 So. 2d 75 (La. 1990) (judicial jurisdiction); Williams v. Ragland, 
567 So. 2d 63 (La. 1990) (judicial retirement); State v. Green, 566 So. 2d 623 (La. 1990) (method 
of appointing state ethics board); State v. Spellman, 562 So. 2d 455 (La. 1990) (due process); 
State v. Burrell, 561 So. 2d 692 (La. 1990) (right to notice of aggravating circumstances); Depart-
ment of Transp. & Dev. v. Dietrich, 555 So. 2d 1355 (La. 1990) (eminent domain). 
163. 555 So. 2d 1355 (La. 1990). 
164. 555 So. 2d at 1358-59. 
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decisions, and the understanding of the provisions' framers. 165 The 
high courts of Kansas,166 Massachusetts, 167 and New York168 also de-
cided a small number of cases that treated state constitutional claims 
with comparable respect. 
3. The California Caseload 
This subsection and the next examine briefly some peculiarities of 
specific states that make them exceptions of sorts to the general trends 
outlined in the previous section. 
Two unusual aspects of the California Supreme Court's caseload 
complicate any attempts to generalize about its state constitutional de-
cisions. First, it seems that the majority of the cases in which the 
California court wrote analytical opinions involved only two kinds of 
disputes: mandatory death penalty appeals, all of which involved mul-
tiple issues of federal and state constitutional law; and attorney disci-
pline cases, of which only a handful involved constitutional issues. 
Thus, the court's caseload may not provide a representative sample of 
issues arising under the state constitution. 
Second, many if not most of the state constitutional issues facing 
the court arose from provisions incorporated into the state constitu-
tion by popular initiative rather than by constitutional convention or 
ratification of legislatively proposed amendments. The California 
Supreme Court has plainly adopted an interpretive approach to such 
constitutional provisions that treats them more like statutes than con-
stitutional provisions. That is, the court tends to rely heavily on the 
16S. See Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, S67 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990); Moore v. 
Roemer, S67 So. 2d 7S (La. 1990); Williams v. Ragland, S67 So. 2d 63 (La. 1990). 
166. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Board of County Commrs., 802 P.2d S84 (Kan. 
1990); Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d S41 (Kan. 1990). 
167. See Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commn., S64 N.E.2d S71 (Mass. 1990); 
Opinions of the Justices, SS6 N.E.2d 1002 (Mass. 1990); Collins v. Secretary of the Common-
wealth, SS6 N.E.2d 348 (Mass. 1990). 
168. See People v. Ohrenstein, S6S N.E.2d 493, 498-99 (N.Y. 1990) (discussing history and 
purpose of provision prohibiting use of public money for private undertakings and relying on 
previous New York cases, some of them very old, to interpret provision); People v. Van Pelt, SS6 
N.E.2d 423 (N.Y. 1990) (concluding that state constitution provides broader protection of indi-
vidual rights than federal Constitution and resting conclusion on state standards of fundamental 
fairness and ethical duties of state prosecutors); People v. Vilardi, SSS N.E.2d 91S (N.Y. 1990) 
(same); People v. Kern, SS4 N.E.2d 123S, 1241 (N.Y. 1990) (examining text of state constitu-
tional provision, comparing it to text of corresponding federal provision, and touching upon 
understanding of the 1938 constitutional convention that drafted state provision). Other cases in 
which the court could be considered to have engaged in more considered constitutional analysis 
are People v. Scalza, S63 N.E.2d 70S (N.Y. 1990) (performing perfunctory constitutional analy-
sis of provision establishing county courts); City of New York v. State, S62 N.E.2d 118 (N.Y. 
1990) (construing home rule provision); People v. Bing, SSS N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1990) (constru-
ing right to counsel provision); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State, SSO N.E.2d 919, 923-24 
(N.Y. 1990) (construing state court jurisdictional provisions). 
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text and what it calls the voters' intent169 rather than more "constitu-
tional" factors such as the structure and political theory of, and values 
expressed in, the document. The court's approach is consistent with 
and may even be required by the theory of the state constitution, 
which places restrictions on the types of measures that can be added to 
the constitution by initiative.170 The California Supreme Court is thus 
sometimes put in the strange position of striking down parts of the 
state constitution as unconstitutional. 171 This phenomenon suggests 
that the state constitution may be viewed as creating two classes of 
constitutional provisions, some of which are more "constitutional" 
than others. But whatever the basis of the court's statutory approach 
to initiative-generated constitutional provisions, the approach limits 
the types of elements that are likely to enter into the state constitu-
1 tional discourse. 
4. New Hampshire 
I have saved New Hampshire for last because its state constitu-
tional jurisprudence in several respects departs dramatically from that 
of the states surveyed above, in ways that make the state a New Feder-
alist's dream. At the same time, though, the court's decisions show 
that even a court that actively pursues New Federalism's ideals may be 
unable to escape the imposing shadow of federal constitutional law. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court is a court trying mightily to 
seize independent control of state constitutional law. First, unlike any 
of the other courts we have examined, it has consciously developed a 
habit of making Michigan v. Long statements in its opinions dealing 
with the state constitution. Thus, the court routinely states specifi-
cally that its rulings are made under "our own interpretation of the 
New Hampshire Constitution,"172 or "as a matter of State law."173 
Where the court examines federal constitutional rulings in the course 
of its state constitutional analysis, it is often at pains to point out that 
it looks to federal law "not as binding precedent but only for gui-
dance." 174 These pronouncements seem more than adequate to insu-
late the state rulings from federal review. 
Second, the court has begun to develop conventions governing the 
169. E.g., Davis v. City of Berkeley, 794 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1990). 
170. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). 
171. See Raven, 801 P.2d at 1089. 
172. State v. Gallant, 574 A.2d 385, 391 (N.H. 1990). 
173. State v. Thompson, 571 A.2d 266, 268 (N.H. 1990). 
174. State v. Bosquet, 578 A.2d 853, 855 (N.H. 1990); accord State v. Williams, 581 A.2d 78, 
80 (N.H. 1990); State v. Gallant, 574 A.2d 385, 391 (N.H. 1990). 
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circumstances under which it will construe the state constitution. 
Most prominently, the court has explicitly stated its intention to adopt 
a primacy approach to state constitutional claims under which it will 
adjudicate state constitutional issues before turning to federal ones. 175 
In addition, the court has held that as a general rule it will not con-
sider state constitutional claims unless they were properly raised in the 
court below ,176 
Finally, the court has proceeded to rest a comparatively large pro-
portion of its constitutional rulings on state grounds. In 1990, the 
court decided state constitutional issues in 34 (24%) of the 139 full 
opinions it issued. In 12 of these cases, the court resolved the case on 
state constitutional grounds without ever considering how it might 
come out under the federal Constitution.177 In 8 cases, the court 
looked to federal law for guidance but ultimately grounded its opinion 
firmly in the state constitution.178 In 4 cases, the court considered 
parallel claims under the state and federal constitutions where the rele-
vant standards were the same and would have yielded the same out-
come, yet deliberately refrained from performing a federal 
constitutional analysis and instead rested the case exclusively on state 
constitutfonal grounds.179 And in one additional case, the court held 
that the state constitution provided greater protection than the compa-
rable federal provision.180 Thus, nearly three quarters of the court's 
state constitutional decisions were based on the state constitution in-
dependent of federal law. 
175. See State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (N.H. 1983). 
176. See State v. Dellorfano, 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (N.H. 1986). 
177. State v. Elliott, 585 A.2d 304 (N.H. 1990) (grand jury indictment); Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 584 A.2d 1342 (N.H. 1990) (taxation); Lussier v. New England Power Co., 584 A.2d 179 
(N.H. 1990) (right to jury trial); State v. Gooden, 582 A.2d 607 (N.H. 1990) (double jeopardy); 
In re Estate ofMcQuesten, 578 A.2d 335 (N.H. 1990) (takings and due process); State v. Eason, 
577 A.2d 1203 (N.H. 1990) (rights to produce evidence and to confront); Appeal of Maddox, 575 
A.2d 1 (N.H. 1990) (impartial administrative decisionmaker); State v. Monsalve, 574 A.2d 1384 
(N.H. 1990) (due process); New Hampshire Mun. Trust Workers' Compensation Fund v. Flynn, 
573 A.2d 439 (N.H. 1990) (local government funding); Kiluk v. Potter, 572 A.2d 1157 (N.H. 
1990) (state court jurisdiction); State v. Lachapelle, 572 A.2d 584 (N.H. 1990) (notice of criminal 
charges); State v. Smith, 571 A.2d 279 (N.H. 1990) (right to bear arms, procedural due process). 
178. State v. Williams, 581 A.2d 78 (N.H. 1990) (right to jury trial); State v. Pellicci, 580 
A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990) (searches); State v. Bousquet, 578 A.2d 853 (N.H. 1990) (right to jury 
trial); In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325 (N.H. 1990) (equal protection); Dover v. 
Imperial Casualty & lndem. Co., 575 A.2d 1280 (N.H. 1990) (equal protection); State v. Gallant, 
574 A.2d 385 (N.H. 1990) (searches); State v. Field, 571 A.2d 1276 (N.H. 1990) (exclusionary 
rule); State v. Thompson, 571 A.2d 266 (N.H. 1990) ("knock-and-announce" rule). 
179. State v. Bousquet, 578 A.2d 853 (N.H. 1990) (right to jury trial); In re Certain Scholar-
ship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325 (N.H. 1990) (equal protection); State v. Green, 575 A.2d 1308, 1315 
(N.H. 1990) (searches); State v. Settle, 570 A.2d 895, 897 (N.H. 1990) (sufficiency of indictment), 
180. State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990) (holding canine sniff a search under state 
constitution). 
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Yet even in this New Federalism paradise, all is not entirely well. 
For example, despite its attempts to distinguish clearly between state 
and federal constitutional claims, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
has sometimes fallen prey to the same kinds of obscurities we have 
seen in the decisions of other state high courts. Thus, in 4 cases the 
court failed to specify whether the· constitutional claim under consid-
eration was a state or federal claim, 181 and in 8 cases both federal and 
state constitutional claims were raised but the basis of the court's rul-
ing was unclear.182 
A much more fundamental problem with the court's state constitu-
tional jurisprudence, however, is that its independence is ultimately 
illusory. The court has held explicitly that the state and federal consti-
tutions have essentially the same meaning in a variety of circum-
stances involving issues such as probable cause, interrogations, due 
process, and ineffective assistance of counsel.183 Moreover, in many 
instances where the court has expressly asserted decisional indepen-
dence under state law, the language and structure of its analyses of the 
state constitution are quite clearly borrowed from federal constitu-
tional law .184 For example, the state constitution's equal protection 
analysis and terminology is precisely the same as the federal, 185 even if 
the state and federal courts might not always agree on the applications 
of the relevant tests. Together, these types of cases account for nearly 
half of the court's state constitutional caseload. 
Most importantly, notwithstanding whatever legal independence 
the court may have achieved from federal constitutional law, it has 
failed to achieve any kind of independence in its constitutional dis-
course. For all its talk of independence, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court rarely decides a case without keeping one eye on the comparable 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. In addition, the New Hampshire 
court's opinions are largely devoid of any kind of language that could 
181. State v. Zurita, 584 A.2d 758 (N.H. 1990) (confessions); State v. Plante, 577 A.2d 95 
(N.H. 1990) (confessions); State v. Green, 575 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1990) (challenge to stop); Kakris 
v. Montbleau, 575 A.2d 1293 (N.H. 1990) (due process). 
182. State v. Pond, 584 A.2d 770 (N.H. 1990) (double jeopardy); Bussiere v. Cunningham, 
571 A.2d 908 (N.H. 1990) (due process liberty); Humphrey v. Cunningham, 584 A.2d 763 (N.H. 
1990) (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Fennell, 578 A.2d 329 (N.H. 1990) (ineffective 
assistance of counsel); State v. Cox, 575 A.2d 1320 (N.H. 1990) (right to present exculpatory 
evidence); State v. Green, 575 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1990) (interrogation); State v. Tucker, 575 A.2d 
810 (N.H. 1990) (suppression); State v. Davis, 575 A.2d 4 (N.H. 1990) (probable cause). In all 
but the first two of these cases, the court held that the applicable analysis was the same under 
either constitution, but failed to specify whether the basis of its holding was the state or federal 
constitution, or both. In none of the cases did the court make a Long statement. 
183. See the last six cases cited supra note 182. 
184. See supra note 178. 
185. E.g., In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325, 1326-27 (N.H. 1990). 
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furnish the basis for a discourse of distinctiveness - a way of explain-
ing differences between the state and federal constitutions. The cur-
rent New Hampshire Constitution has been in effect since 1784, and it 
is hardly implausible that small, relatively isolated New Hampshire 
could have developed over the past two centuries some kinds of cul-
tural and political differences from the rest of the nation that would 
show up in its constitutional discourse and jurisprudence. Yet one 
searches the state court's decisions in vain for any indication of such 
differences; there is no discussion of the state's founding history, no 
mention of its constitution's framers, and no suggestion that the fun-
damental values or character of the people of the state differ in any 
way from those of the people of the nation. 
C. Conclusions 
The overwhelming impression left by an examination of state con-
stitutional decisions is that state courts by and large have little interest 
in creating the kind of state constitutional discourse necessary to build 
an independent body of state constitutional law. With a handful of 
exceptions, the decisions fail to address state constitutional issues 
squarely and independently from federal constitutional jurisprudence, 
and show no sign of any discourse of distinctness that would allow 
participants in the legal system to craft intelligible arguments about 
the nature of any differences between the state and federal 
constitutions. 
By engaging in extensive lockstep analysis, many courts have also 
created an atmosphere in which it is unnecessary to distinguish be-
tween the state and federal constitutions because they are generally 
held to have the same meaning. This reduces state constitutional law 
to a redundancy and greatly discourages its use and development. In 
the few cases in which courts hold the state and federal constitutions 
to be distinct, they often seem to have done so in a way that is so 
idiosyncratically result-oriented as to provide little basis for further 
intelligible debate about the nature of the differences between the two 
documents that account for the court's departures from federal norms. 
Certainly, litigants can hardly be confident about replicating the re-
sults of such cases in factually distinct circumstances. 
Furthermore, the lesson of Michigan v. Long seems not to have 
penetrated the jurisprudence of any state other than New Hampshire. 
By failing to specify when holdings rest on state constitutional 
grounds and by borrowing extensively from federal case law when 
construing their state constitutions, state courts not only confuse par-
ticipants in the state legal system but also leave themselves highly vul-
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nerable to Supreme Court review of decisions that may rest on 
adequate and independent state grounds. 
When he was still on the Oregon Supreme Court, Hans Linde com-
plained that "[a] generation of lawyers ... seems literally speechless" 
when faced with questions of state constitutional law.186 In view of 
the actual condition of state constitutional law, however, such silence 
seems understandable enough when lawyers lack a language in which 
to speak, or at best have a language that is too impoverished to allow 
them to say anything worthwhile.181 
IV. THE STANDARD EXPLANATIONS 
We have seen that state constitutional discourse is for the most 
part far from the vigorously independent discourse New Federalism 
hoped for; it is impoverished by comparison to federal constitutional 
discourse, and it generally fails to provide a language that participants 
in the legal system can use effectively to debate the meaning of the 
state constitution. State courts often seem downright reluctant to con-
strue their state constitutions at all, and when they do so their opin-
ions are often vague, perfunctory, or almost entirely dependent on 
analytic strategies and terminology borrowed from federal constitu-
tional discourse. 
Why should this be the case? Why, after more than two centuries 
of state constitutionalism, has state constitutional law so spectacularly 
failed to flourish? Advocates of New Federalism have come up with 
several standard and widely accepted explanations for this phenome-
non. In this section, I review these explanations, and argue that they 
fail to account for the poverty of state constitutional discourse. 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment 
By far the most widely accepted explanation for the poverty of 
contemporary state constitutional law holds that it was marginalized 
by the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine. Until the 
early part of this century, the U.S. Supreme Court adhered to the view 
that the federal Bill of Rights constrained only the federal govern-
ment; any similar restrictions on state government, if they existed, 
were contained in state constitutions.188 Starting in the 1930s, how-
ever, and continuing into the 1960s, the Supreme Court began to inter-
186. Linde, supra note 30, at 391. 
187. For a different view of the constitutional jurisprudence of the New York Court of Ap-
peals, see Vincent M. Bonaventre, State Constitutionalism in New York: A Non-Reactive Tradi-
tion, 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CON5f. L. 31 (1989). 
188. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
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pret the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating many of the 
standards contained in the Bill of Rights as limitations on state 
power.189 
Proponents of what I shall call the "Fourteenth Amendment the-
sis" argue that the process of incorporation "federalized" the business 
of interpreting constitutional rights. 190 By making states enforce fed-
eral constitutional standards, 191 incorporation "obscured the func-
tional independence" of state courts, 192 and required state courts to 
look to federal law in order to resolve a wide variety of constitutional 
issues. As a result, the argument goes, state courts have simply gotten 
into the habit of looking to federal constitutional law for the answer to 
constitutional questions, whether state or federal.193 
This explanation is wholly inadequate; indeed, it is not an explana-
tion of state court behavior at all, but rather a description of such 
behavior. Under our system of government, states are independent 
sovereigns and state supreme courts are the final arbiters of constitu-
tional self-government on the state level. In the early days of the re-
public, state courts often jealously guarded against any perceived 
federal encroachments on state sovereignty and independence. In 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 194 for example, the Virginia courts rejected 
the authority of the Supreme Court to review state court decisions on 
federal law; the Supreme Court thus had to struggle with state courts 
over what now seem some of the least controversial aspects of consti-
tutional federalism. 
While we no longer expect state courts to resist rulings that the 
Supreme Court is entitled to make and enforce, we might well expect 
state courts to continue to protect state sovereignty and independence 
where it is possible to do so. Had state courts in the middle decades of 
this century been animated by such a spirit, there was certainly noth-
ing stopping them from staving off the federal dominance in constitu-
tional rights brought about by the Supreme Court's incorporation 
decisions. For example, state courts could have utilized their state 
189. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 772-74 (2d ed. 
1988). 
190. E.g., Kaye, supra note 5, at 404-05; Linde, supra note 30, at 382-83; Gary L. McDowell, 
Foreword: Rediscovering Federalism? State Constitutional Law and the Restoration of State Sov-
ereignty, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 797, 802-07 (1990). 
191. Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 1, at 495. 
192. Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 1328. 
193. See Howard, supra note 25, at 878 ("During the activist Warren years, it was easy for 
state courts ... to fall into the drowsy habit of looking no further than federal constitutional 
law."); accord Project Report, supra note 25, at 274. 
194. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
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constitutions before the Supreme Court began its string of incorpora-
tion decisions, thereby preventing the Court from gaining the impres-
sion that states would not protect the fundamental rights of U.S. 
citizens unless forced to do so by the imposition of federal constitu-
tional standards.195 Or, upon perceiving a threat to state sovereignty, 
state courts could have seized the initiative in elaborating constitu-
tional rights by giving generous interpretations to their state constitu-
tions, something they did not even begin to do until recently, when it 
was probably too late. The real question is thus not whether incorpo-
ration changed the constitutional landscape, but why state courts did 
nothing to influence the final result. t96 
Furthermore, even if the Fourteenth Amendment thesis could ex-
plain the withering of state constitutional jurisprudence in the area of 
individual rights, it has no power to explain the current extent to 
which federal constitutional discourse dominates state constitutional 
law. It is useful here to distinguish between two types of state consti-
tutional provisions. Dependent provisions are provisions of the state 
constitution that have federal analogues capable of controlling the out-
come of cases in which both provisions apply. For example, a state 
search and seizure provision is dependent because it has a federal ana-
logue - the Fourth Amendment - capable of controlling the out-
come of the case, depending on the interpretation the federal courts 
have given it. An independent state constitutional provision is one 
that cannot be displaced, regardless of whether an analogous federal 
constitutional provision exists. For example, a state constitutional 
provision governing executive power is independent because the state 
court's construction of that provision will define the extent of the gov-
ernor's power regardless of how the Supreme Court interprets the 
powers of the President under the federal Constitution. 
The Fourteenth Amendment thesis could at best explain why fed-
eral constitutional discourse has come to dominate the state constitu-
195. State courts arguably had such poor records of protecting the fundamental rights of 
their citizens, see supra note 29, that there was nothing for the Fourteenth Amendment to 
marginalize. 
196. A variation of the Fourteenth Amendment thesis holds that state courts failed to de-
velop independent state constitutional law because they were literally "too busy" keeping up with 
rapidly changing federal constitutional law to pay much attention to their own constitutions. See 
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 4; A.E. Dick Howard, A 
Frequent Recurrence to First Principles, Introduction to id., at xi, xv. It is surprising that such an 
argument could be seriously advanced. Nobody has claimed that state courts failed to continue 
developing state common law during this period because the constitutional decisions of the 
Supreme Court kept them too busy. Nor is there any evidence that lower federal courts had the 
slightest difficulty "keeping up" with the Supreme Court's constitutional rulings. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court incorporation cases could just as easily be viewed as saving time for state courts 
by providing vivid demonstrations of the proper way to interpret a constitution. 
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tional discourse of dependent provisions of state constitutions. If the 
outcome of a state constitutional case dealing with free speech or in-
voluntary confessions turns in the final analysis on whether any stan-
dard set by the state constitution satisfies the demands of the 
controlling federal constitutional provision, 197 state courts might de-
velop a tendency to use the terms of the federal discourse even when 
discussing the state constitutional issue. In reality, however, state 
courts have adopted the federal analysis and terms of debate not 
merely when construing dependent provisions governed by Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporation, but also for many independent state con-
stitutional provisions that federal law - as incorporated in the Four-
teenth Amendment - is powerless to affect. 
Consider, for example, the political question doctrine. The doc-
trine, a judicial gloss on the jurisdictional provisions of Article III of 
the federal Constitution, holds that federal courts may not hear certain 
types of cases for which the exercise of judicial power is deemed inap-
propriate.198 Typically, the doctrine is invoked in instances where the 
Supreme Court would conceive itself to be meddling in the legitimate 
affairs of other branches of government; for example, the doctrine ap-
plies to cases in which the court lacks expertise or which involve the 
exercise of a power constitutionally committed to the executive or leg-
islative branches.199 Several state supreme courts have held that state 
court jurisdiction is limited by a state version of the federal political 
question doctrine, and some courts have more or less expressly incor-
porated the leading federal cases into the state's political question 
jurisprudence. 200 
Now it is certainly possible for a state constitution to contain a 
political question doctrine, and it is even possible for the state doctrine 
to be so similar to the federal version that precisely the same analysis 
could be used for both - possible, but highly unlikely. Unlike the 
federal courts, which are courts of limited jurisdiction, state courts 
197. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; amend. 14. 
198. The leading case is still Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See also Goldwater v. 
Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998-1000 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). 
199. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
200. See Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 480 A.2d 476, 481-83 (Conn. 1984); State ex rel. Oberly v. 
Troise, 526 A.2d 898, 904-05 (Del. 1987); Trustees of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 737 P.2d 
446, 455-56 (Haw. 1987); Kluk v. Lang, 531 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Ill. 1988); Gilbert v. Gladden, 432 
A.2d 1351, 1354 (N.J. 1981); State ex rel. Meshel v. Keip, 423 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ohio 1981); People 
v. Ohrenstein, 549 N.Y.S.2d 962, 971 (App.Div. 1989), affd. on other grounds, 565 N.E.2d 493 
(N.Y. 1990) (adopting Baker analysis). Other cases are collected in Nat Stern, The Political 
Question Doctrine in State Courts, 35 S.C. L. REv. 405 (1984). 
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may be courts of general jurisdiction.201 In the absence of limiting 
constitutional language, the ordinary presumption would be that state 
courts are constitutionally empowered to hear cases, not that they 
share a limitation in common with federal courts.202 Further, virtu-
ally all state courts have significant common law powers that federal 
courts lack. The power to elaborate the common law is a power to 
make law, and to do so in what are nowadays extremely complex areas 
such as tort liability and contractual relations. The political question 
doctrine, however, is based on the incompetence of federal courts to 
invade the legislative sphere, or to deal with complex aspects of social 
policy - actions that state courts take routinely when exercising their 
common law powers. Thus, it is not at all clear that state courts 
should be subject to a political question limitation, and if they are, it 
seems implausible that the state limitation would be nearly so restric-
tive as the federal one. 203 
Similarly, several state supreme courts have adopted the federal 
interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause204 and the federal sepa-
ration of powers bar on the legislative veto, 205 both aspects of state 
constitutional law that might be expected to differ, perhaps signifi-
cantly, from their federal counterparts.206 The Fourteenth Amend-
201. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 401-02 (1857); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 
1, 15 (1976). . 
202. This phenomenon can be seen clearly in state law dealing with standing. Many states 
have far more relaxed rules of standing than federal courts due to the unrestricted jurisdiction of 
state courts. See generally Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 
63 TExAs L. REV. 1269, 1298-303 (1985). Others permit their courts to issue advisory opinions, 
something federal courts are forbidden to do because of the lack of a case or controversy. U.S. 
CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. l; see Charles M. Carberry, Co=ent, The State Advisory Opinion in 
Perspective, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (1975). 
203. Cf. Dennis NettikSi=ons, Towards a Theory of State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 46 
MONT. L. REV. 261, 285 (1985). 
204. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
205. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
206. For example, a state version of the Speech or Debate Clause might differ from the fed-
eral version because state legislatures, unlike Congress, have the direct power to pass legislation 
insulating themselves from liability under state law for statements made or things done in the 
course of their legislative duties. In addition, state courts have the power to create exceptions to 
common law doctrines, such as libel, for such public policy reasons as immunizing legislators in 
appropriate situations. These factors might suggest an extremely narrow reading for a state 
Speech or Debate Clause on the theory that the state legislature or courts can always broaden the 
scope of legislative i=unity. 
Similarly, there is no good reason to assume that the legislative veto would be unconstitu-
tional under a state constitution. The Supreme Court invalidated the use of legislative vetoes on 
separation of power grounds, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), but the structure of separa-
tion of powers under state constitutions often differs dramatically from the federal division of 
power. For example, governors often have line-item veto powers; courts often have lawmaking 
and rulemaking powers; and lower-ranking executive branch officials, such as attorneys general 
and comptrollers, are often independently elected. Given these differences, it does not necessar-
ily follow that the separation of powers means the same thing under a state constitution as under 
the U.S. Constitution. 
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ment thesis fails to explain the willingness of state courts to adopt 
federal doctrine in these areas in which state constitutional law oper-
ates completely independently of federal power. 
B. Lawyers and Law Schools 
The second most popular explanation for the languishing of state 
constitutional law offered by New Federalism advocates is that law-
yers who appear in state court fail to raise independent state constitu-
tional arguments.207 Some have added that the fault really lies with 
the law schools, which fail to teach state constitutional law.208 This 
finger-pointing, which seems especially popular with state judges,2°9 is 
occasionally accompanied by a disapproving suggestion of lawyer lazi-
ness: "[T]o make an independent argument under the state [constitu-
tion]," former Justice Hans Linde has admonished, "takes homework 
- in texts, in history, in alternative approaches to analysis."210 
The suggestion that lawyers are somehow responsible for the fail-
ure of state courts to develop state constitutional jurisprudence is 
frankly absurd. Lawyers will make the arguments they need to make 
to win cases. If lawyers are not making state constitutional argu-
ments, it is because doing so does not help them win.211 As the survey 
of state constitutional cases in the previous section shows, state courts 
often discourage the making of such arguments by their own adjudica-
tory practices. 
As for law schools, it is undoubtedly always popular to blame 
them for ills of the legal system, and sometimes such blame may be 
justified - but not in this case. It is true that few law schools offer 
courses in the constitutional law of particular states; but it is equally 
true that few law schools offer courses in the contract, tort, or prop-
erty law of particular states. Somehow law school graduates are able 
to work effectively within the state common law systems after a legal 
education in general principles of those areas of law, and constitu-
tional law is no different. The real problem is not the education in 
207. Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1161-63; Collins, supra note 25, at 19 n.69; James C. 
Kirby, Jr., Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulation Under State Constitutions, in DE-
VELOPMENTS IN STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 94, 94-95; Linde, supra note 30, 
at 391-92; Pollock, supra note 2, at 721-22; Collins, supra note 29, at 9 & n.75. 
208. Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1163; Abrahamson, supra note 29, at 964; Douglas, supra 
note 29, at 1147; Kaye, supra note 5, at 405; Linde, supra note 30, at 392; Linde, supra note 5, at 
174-75; Collins, supra note 29, at 5-6. 
209. See the articles by Judge Judith Kaye, supra note 5, former Justice Hans Linde, supra 
notes 5 and 30, Justice Shirley Abrahamson, supra notes 5 and 29, and Justice Charles G. Doug-
las, III, supra note 29. 
210. Linde, supra note 30, at 392. 
211. Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1162-63. 
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state constitutional law offered by law schools, but the one offered by 
state courts. 
C. Lack of Historical Data 
A third explanation sometimes given for the impoverishment of 
state constitutional law is the dea,:th of historical materials related to 
the founding of the state constitution.212 The lack of such materials 
can hinder the search for constitutional meaning by making it ex-
tremely difficult to reconstruct the intent of the framers, thereby hin-
dering the development of an independent state constitutional 
discourse and making the turn to federal analogues more appealing. 
This is a cogent explanation, but, as it turns out, one available to very 
few states. 
Among the fifty states, only Massachusetts, Vermont, and New 
Hampshire now operate under constitutions adopted in the eighteenth 
century.213 The present constitutions of eighteen states were adopted 
after 1900, and fifteen states operate under constitutions that were 
adopted between 1875 and 1899.214 The recency of these documents 
greatly enhances the possibility of meaningful historical research. 
Moreover, even the older constitutions have been amended so often 
that the adoption of many significant constitutional provisions is likely 
to be well recorded.215 And even where recordkeeping at constitu-
tional conventions was skimpy, other sources such as newspaper ac-
counts and the personal correspondence of delegates can help fill in 
the historical gaps. Work by Justice Robert F. Utter of the Washing-
ton Supreme Court illustrates the type of creative historical research 
that can be done in this area.216 
Finally, detailed historical records are simply not necessary to cre-
ate a rich constitutional discourse. Chief Justice John Marshall lacked 
many of the historical sources that are readily available to and rou-
tinely consulted by judges and lawyers today,217 yet he managed none-
212. See, e.g., Teachout, supra note 28. 
213. Sturm, supra note 69, at 75-76. 
214. Id. at 74-76. 
215. Grodin, supra note 54, at 393-95 (discussing documentation of 1849 California constitu-
tional convention); Vito J. Titone, State Constitutional Interpretation: The Search for an Anchor 
in a Rough Sea, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. R:Ev. 431, 459-63 (1987). 
216. See Utter, supra note 35, at 253-59; Robert F. Utter, Church and State on the Frontier: 
The History of the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS 
CoNST. L.Q. 451 (1988). 
217. For example, James Madison's notes of the constitutional convention were not pub-
lished until 1840, after his death. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 viii-ix (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966). 
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theless almost single-handedly to found the rich and intricate federal 
constitutional discourse that we have inherited. 
V. THE FAILURE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
If none of the reasons examined above explains the poverty of 
modern state constitutional discourse, what can explain it? In this 
Part, I argue that the cause of the problem is a failure that goes much 
deeper than the actions of the Supreme Court, the state bar, or the law 
schools. All these groups, as well as state courts themselves, are re-
sponding to the same underlying phenomenon: the failure of state 
constitutionalism itself to provide a workable model for the contempo-
rary practice of constitutional law and discourse on the state level. In 
particular, state courts do not talk about state constitutions in the way 
New Federalism advocates because to do so would be to talk in a way 
that, under present conditions, simply makes no sense. 
A. State Constitutionalism 
State constitutionalism lies at the intersection of two powerful 
American political doctrines: federalism and constitutionalism. Fed-
eralism provides a theory of statehood, constitutionalism a theory of 
the nature of constitutions. Together, these two sets of principles pro-
vide a guiding, foundational approach to the interpretation of state 
constitutions, an approach that has decisively shaped the thinking of 
New Federalism advocates, as well as state courts themselves. 
1. Federalism 
The fundamental organizing principle that distinguishes states 
from other political entities in our system of government is the famil-
iar notion of federalism. According to federalist doctrine, the United 
States is a unique kind of republic composed of individual state gov-
ernments and a single, overarching national government. Although 
the states are "constituent parts" of the United States,21s they are not 
in any essential way subordinate to the national government. Rather, 
the state and national governments together comprise a system of dual 
sovereignty219 in which each government is deemed to be an independ-
ent sovereign, but in distinct spheres of action.220 Madison, for exam-
ple, conceived that the national government would have primary 
218. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 37, No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), at 76. 
219. RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 48-76 (1987). 
220. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 37, No. 39 (James Madison), at 244; see DAVID F. EP-
STEIN, THE PoLmCAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 51-52 (1984). 
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responsibility for "external objects, as war, peace, negotiation and for-
eign commerce"; the states, on the other hand, would exercise sover-
eignty principally over "the lives, liberties, and properties of the 
people."221 
At the time of the framing of the Constitution, there was some 
disagreement over the idea of dividing governmental sovereignty in 
this way; some thought that sovereignty was by its nature indivisible, 
and that any attempt to divide it must fail. The Framers solved this 
theoretical difficulty by locating a single, indivisible sovereignty in the 
people themselves. As ultimate sovereign, the people could divide up 
the powers of government and distribute them as they saw fit.222 
Thus, according to Madison, "The federal and State governments are 
in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with 
different powers and designed for different purposes."223 
Under this plan, the people have organized themselves for pur-
poses of self-government in the following way. First, all the people of 
the United States together constitute a society that has created and is 
jointly subject to the rule of the national government within its desig-
nated scope. Second, the people have divided themselves into sepa-
rate, smaller societies - the states - and are subject in this second 
capacity to the rule of the government of the state in which they re-
side.224 Every citizen thus belongs to two distinct political societies, 
each constituted for a different purpose and having different powers 
and characteristics. 
In this way, federalism provides a clear political definition of state-
hood. 225 According to federalist doctrine, a state is a self-governing 
political society of individuals who comprise a subset of all American 
citizens. The state government is created by the people of the state 
and given such powers as the people deem appropriate, other than 
those specifically delegated to the United States, another self-gov-
erning society to which the people of the state also belong. The state 
government thus possesses whatever independent sovereign power the 
221. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 37, No. 45, at 292-93; see also id. No. 39 (James 
Madison), at 245 (states would exercise "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other 
objects" not put within power of national government). 
222. See BERGER, supra note 219, at 51-52 (remarks of James Wilson). 
223. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 37, No. 46, at 294. 
224. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 37, No. 39 (James Madison), at 245. 
225. Federalism's political premises rest on other philosophic considerations that are not 
directly relevant here, such as Enlightenment era epistemology and related theories of natural 
law. For a survey of these ideas, see MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (1987). For a more complete discussion of the contours of the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty, see James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing 
Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. REv. 189, 200-13 (1990). 
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people of the state choose to give it, within the potential realm of ac-
tivity allowed it by the national political society. 
2. Constitutionalism 
The other half of the state constitutionalism equation is the notion 
of constitutionalism - the idea that a constitution is a unique docu-
ment of political foundation. Like federalism, constitutionalism is 
close to the heart of American political theory and rests on many of 
the same political premises. 
The pithiest, although by no means the first, expression of the es-
sence of American constitutionalism is Chief Justice John Marshall's 
remark in McCulloch v. Maryland: 226 "[W]e must never forget," he 
wrote, "that it is a constitution we are expounding. "227 This cryptic 
phrase aptly captures the judicial view, embraced consistently ever 
since, that a constitution is different from other types of documents 
that courts may be called upon to interpret and must be approached at 
all times with those differences in mind. 
The first and foremost difference between a constitution and other 
sources of law is that a constitution is considered to be a direct act of 
the sovereign people themselves.228 Because the people are the sover-
eigns in our system and the government merely the people's agents, a 
constitution speaks with a political authority that no law or other gov-
ernmental action can ever attain. The constitution is thus a form of 
higher law that always binds the government, and is unchangeable ex-
cept by further action of the people themselves.229 That a constitution 
is written only further evidences the people's intent that it be 
permanent. 
But it is not only the authority of a constitution that distinguishes 
it from other forms of law; it differs in subject matter as well. A con-
stitution is a charter of self-government; it is the means by which the 
people communicate to their agents the scope of authority that may be 
wielded in the people's behalf.230 As a result, according once again to 
Chief Justice Marshall, the nature of a constitution "requires, that 
only its great outlines should be marked, [and] its important objects 
226. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
227. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. 
228. See, e.g., U.S. CoNST. pmbl. ("We the People ..• "); Gardner, supra note 225, at 200· 
13. 
229. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 66 (1982); Henry Monaghan, Our Per-
fect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 376 & n. 135, 392 (1981); Earl Maltz, Foreword: The 
Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 801-02. 
230. Cf THE FEDERALIST, supra note 37, No. 10 (James Madison), at 82; No. 2 (John Jay), 
at 37; No. 46, at 294; No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), at 467. 
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designated."231 To use the current language of the Supreme Court, 
the Constitution embodies the "fundamental values" of the American 
people.232 
Although these principles of constitutionalism are most often asso-
ciated with the U.S. Constitution, they are generally thought to apply 
with equal force to state constitutions. The only difference is that the 
federal Constitution is thought to express the fundamental values and 
choices of the national polity, and state constitutions are thought to 
express the fundamental values of the various state polities that have 
adopted them. Thus, many state supreme courts use the language of 
"fundamental values" when construing their state constitutions;233 as 
Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals has written, the 
state constitution is "that set of values to which we have bound our-
selves, the values that transcend even our currently made choices."234 
3. Constitutionalism and Constitutional Discourse 
In addition to their political dimensions, constitutionalism and fed-
eralism also suggest a way of thinking about the community-defining 
aspects of constitutional discourse. Because a constitution is a docu-
ment that by definition embodies the most fundamental decisions of a 
polity concerning the ways in which its members want to live their 
lives, a constitution necessarily reveals a wealth of information about 
the character of those who, politically speaking, are its authors.235 To 
place instructions in a constitution is to say that certain things shall or 
shall not be done, and to constrain the actions of the government in 
this way is to say that we are a people who will not tolerate (or who 
require) certain types of behavior toward one another. The content of 
a constitution can thus reflect some of the most essential and intimate 
231. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. 
232. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 789 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("The Constitution ..• is a document announcing funda-
mental principles in value-laden terms"); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (Constitution embodies "fundamental value determination of our society that it is far 
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free"); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 
U.S. 447, 471 (1984) (Stevens, J.) (Eighth Amendment reflects "a fundamental value that the 
Framers wished to secure against legislative majorities"). 
233. See, e.g., Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 532 A.2d 346, 350 (Pa. 1987) 
(stating that state constitution establishes reputation as "fundamental right[]"); Bernzen v. City 
of Boulder, 525 P.2d 416, 419 (Col. 1974) (stating that state constitution designates recall, initia-
tive, and referendum as "fundamental rights ••. which the people have reserved unto them-
selves"); Pacheco v. School Dist. No. 11, 516 P.2d 629, 633 (Col. 1973) (Kelley, J., dissenting) 
(stating that state constitution guarantees "fundamental values" against erosion by legislature). 
234. Kaye, supra note 5, at 421. 
235. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text; see also Jerry Frug, Argument as Charac-
ter, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869 (1988). 
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aspects of the character of the people who adopted it, a feature that 
courts can occasionally exploit in order to assist them in construing 
the constitution in difficult cases.236 
In this view, as noted earlier, constitutional discourse transcends 
the bounds of any particular legal dispute or occasion for judicial ac-
tion; it becomes instead a forum in which the members of a polity 
debate their own identity - their character and fundamental values. 
Under the influence of a robust constitutional discourse, the contours 
of the constitution thus come to define not merely a body of positive 
law but the identity and character of the polity itself. 
4. Local Variations in Character 
State constitutionalism, then, holds that a state constitution is the 
creation of the sovereign people of the state and reflects the fundamen-
tal values, and indirectly the character, of that people. An important 
corollary of this proposition is that the fundamental values and char-
acter of the people of the various states actually differ, both from state 
to state and as between the state and national polities. One can con-
firm this corollary by simple observation: no two state constitutions 
are identical, and no state constitution is identical to the federal Con-
stitution. These variations, because they occur in constitutions, are by 
definition of constitutional dimension; the people who adopted the 
constitutions could have made them identical but deliberately chose 
different language and provisions. It follows that these differences re-
flect differences in the fundamental value choices and character of the 
people who made the constitutions. 
This type of argument appears frequently in New Federalism liter-
ature. We are told, for example, that a state constitution must be 
viewed as "a declaration of certain values held by the citizens of that 
state" and that the constitution "reflects the geography, history, cul-
ture and uniqueness" of the state.237 Courts, it is said, have a responsi-
236. Certainly the most notable example of this technique is Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 
(Alaska 1975). There, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the right to privacy guaranteed by 
the state constitution required the invalidation of a law criminalizing the possession of small 
amounts of marijuana in the home. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied explicitly on 
what it viewed as the unique character of Alaskans: 
The privacy amendment to the Alaska Constitution was intended to give recognition and 
protection to the home. Such a reading is consonant with the character of life in Alaska. 
Our territory and now state has traditionally been the home of people who prize their indi· 
viduality and who have chosen to settle or to continue living here in order to achieve a 
measure of control over their own lifestyles which is now virtually unattainable in many of 
our sister states. 
537 P.2d at 503-04. The result in Ravin has since been overturned by passage of a ballot mea· 
sure. See infra note 283. 
237. Judith S. Kaye, A Midpoint Perspective on Directions in State Constitutional Law, 1 
EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CoNsr. L. 17, 19 (1988); see also Abrahamson, supra note 29, at 965 
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bility "to create for each state a jurisprudence uniquely expressive of 
that state's own constitutional culture and faithful to its own particu-
lar traditions."238 Professor A.E. Dick Howard has summed up this 
view of state constitutionalism succinctly: 
[N]o function of a constitution, especially in the American states, is 
more important than its use in defining a people's aspirations and funda-
mental values .... 
. . . A state constitution is a fit place for the people of a state to record 
their moral values, their definition of justice, their hopes for the common 
good. A state constitution defines a way of life. 239 
If the people of the states have unique cultures, traditions, or val-
ues - if they have chosen different ways of life - how might these 
differences translate into constitutional terms? Consider the following 
comparison: 
The founders of a populist frontier state with a tradition of ferocious 
individualism, like Washington or Oregon, probably intended to carve 
out a larger sphere of rights, a larger arena of activity into which the 
government could not intrude, at least with respect to such matters as 
bearing arms and avoiding scrutiny, than a more communitarian, homo-
geneous state like Massachusetts or one with sectarian roots like Mary-
land. Those latter states, on the other hand, might be assumed to have 
cared more deeply about matters of religion. 240 
This narrative is a powerful one, for it contemplates potentially differ-
ent meanings even for constitutions containing identical language. 
These variations in meaning would stem from variations in the charac-
ter of the polities, character differences that cause them to embrace as 
fundamental substantially different values - in this case, the untamed 
but irresponsible westerner and the domesticated but righteous east-
erner choose different ways of life. 
This type of reasoning seems to hold out the greatest hope for the 
type of independent state constitutional discourse New Federalism 
aims for, yet it appears virtually nowhere in the actual discourse of 
state constitutional law. Why? In the following sections I argue that 
participants in the legal system do not talk this way for the simple 
(A state's "land, its industry, its people, its history" may be "peculiarities" that will influence 
interpretation of the state constitution.). 
238. Teachout, supra note 28, at 19; accord NettikSimmons, supra note 203. 
239. Howard, supra note 33, at 14; see also Howard, supra note 196, at xxiii; Howard, supra 
note 25, at 938-39. Other commentators have taken a similar view. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 
237, at 19; Linde, supra note 30, at 395; Teachout, supra note 28, at 19. 
240. David Schuman, Advocacy of State Constitutional Law Cases: A Report from the Prov-
inces, 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CoNsr. L. 275, 285 (1989); cf. Utter, supra note 35, at 244 
(drawing inferences based on "the vast differences in culture, politics, experience, education and 
economic status between ..• the Washington framers of 1889 and the Eastern framers of the 
United States Bill of Rights in 1789 [sic], and the enormous differences of history and local 
conditions that separated the two conventions"). 
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reason that such talk would make no sense. This is so for three rea-
sons. First, the notion of state constitutions as defining distinctive and 
coherent ways of life does not accurately describe actual state constitu-
tions and thus cannot furnish a useful way of talking about them. Sec-
ond, state constitutionalism itself embraces theoretical inconsistencies 
that impair its usefulness as a framework for state constitutional dis-
course. Most significantly, state constitutionalism is incompatible 
with national constitutionalism; indeed, the type of robust state consti-
tutionalism advocated by New Federalism could pose a serious threat 
to the nationwide stability and sense of community that national con-
stitutionalism provides. 
Finally, whatever currency the notion oflocal variations in charac-
ter and values might once have had, it is a notion that no longer de-
scribes in any realistic way the polities of the present day states. 
Regardless of what they may once have been, Americans are now a 
people who are so alike from state to state, and whose identity is so 
much associated with national values and institutions, that the notion 
of significant local variations in character and identity is just too im-
plausible to take seriously as the basis for a distinct constitutional 
discourse. 
B. Conundrums of Character 
Suppose we take seriously the premises of federalism and constitu-
tionalism and apply them to the interpretation of state constitutions -
we must never forget, we might say, that it is a state constitution we 
are expounding. To undertake this task is to encounter significant 
contradictions and implausibilities in the doctrine of state 
constitutionalism. 
The average state constitution is about four times as long as the 
U.S. Constitution;241 the constitutions of Alabama, Oklahoma, and 
Texas are more than eight times as long.242 While every state constitu-
tion contains a bill of rights and sets out a basic three-branch govern-
mental structure, the additional length of state constitutions is 
attributable primarily to two factors. First, state constitutions typi-
cally cover a much broader scope of subject matter than the federal 
Constitution. For example, almost every state constitution contains 
lengthy and explicit provisions about financial matters - how taxes 
are to be assessed, how revenue bills are to be enacted, how revenues 
241. Sturm, supra note 69, at 74. 
242. Id. at 75-76. 
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are to be collected and spent.243 Some state constitutions contain de-
tailed provisions relating to aspects of transportation such as high-
ways, 244 railroads, 245 or levee construction and maintenance. 246 Other 
constitutions contain provisions dealing with corporations,247 
mines,248 interest rates,249 lotteries and bingo,250 and prisons.251 These 
are, of course, concerns entirely absent from the U.S. Constitution that 
are handled on the federal level exclusively as legislative matters. 
Second, state constitutions differ from the federal Constitution in 
the level of detail in which they describe, and therefore the extent to 
which they constrain, governmental action with respect to subjects 
covered by the constitution. For example, as Judge Kaye of the New 
York Court of Appeals is fond of pointing out,252 the New York Con-
stitution contains a provision specifying the width of ski trails in the 
Adirondack Park.253 The California Constitution specifies the way in 
which taxes are to be assessed on golf courses.254 The Texas Constitu-
tion provides for banks' use of "unmanned teller machines."255 
If a state constitution reflects the character of the people of a state, 
what can one say about the character of a people who enshrine these 
types of provisions in their constitutions - who evidently hold the 
values expressed in these provisions so dear that they see a need to 
place them beyond the reach of temporary majorities and transient 
passions, and to permit their alteration only by future direct action of 
the people themselves? Can one say of New Yorkers, for example, 
that they are a people who cherish their liberty to ski? If so, how does 
such a provision fit in with the other liberties conqiined in the New 
York Constitution, such as freedom of speech? Are New Yorkers a 
people who like to talk and schuss? To ski down a mountain and dis-
cuss politics over hot chocolate? If we are to take seriously the notion 
that the state constitution reveals the character of the people, we may 
be forced to the unappetizing conclusion that the people of New York, 
243. See, e.g., CAL. CoNST. art. XIII; N.Y. CoNST. arts. 7-8. 
244. See MINN. CoNST. art. 14. 
245. See, e.g., OKLA. CoNST. art. IX; Mo. CONST. art. 11, §§ 9-11. 
246. See MISS. CoNST. art. 11. 
247. See, e.g., IDAHO CoNST. art. 11; Mo. CONST. art. 11; TEX. CONST. art. XII. 
248. See, e.g., WY. CONST. art. 9; N.M. CoNST. art. 17. 
249. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 15. 
250. See, e.g., KAN. CoNST. art. 15, §§ 3, 3a. 
251. See, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. 10. 
252. Kaye, supra note 237, at 18-19; Kaye, supra note 5, at 408. 
253. See N.Y. CoNST. art. 14, § 1. 
254. See CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 10. 
255. See TEX. CoNST. art. 16, § 16. 
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or California, or Texas are simply a frivolous people who are unable to 
distinguish between things that are truly important and things that are 
not. 
In a similar vein, consider that Louisiana has had eleven constitu-
tions since it became a state, and that Georgia has had nine, South 
Carolina seven, and Virginia, Alabama, and Florida six each. 256 The 
Alabama Constitution has been amended over five hundred times,257 
the California and South Carolina Constitutions over four hundred 
times, and the Texas Constitution more than two hundred times.258 If 
these histories also reveal the character of the people of the states, they 
reveal people who are fickle and unreflective - people who do not 
know what they want, who change their mind frequently, and who are 
apparently incapable of learning from their mistakes. 
Conclusions such as these strike powerfully at the premises of con-
stitutionalism. A people who are frivolous, or fickle, or unreflective, 
are a people not worthy of respect. And a people whom we cannot 
respect are not a people to whom we can comfortably attribute an 
overall constitutional plan, a meaningful history of purposeful debate, 
or a coherent political theory - the very factors noticeably absent 
from state constitutional discourse. Moreover, this suspicion of the 
people and of their constitution severely constrains the way in which it 
is possible to talk about the meaning of the constitution. To be sure, 
we will always have the text of individual provisions, and there may be 
some sort of legislative history associated with each such provision. 
But we may feel extremely uncomfortable in these circumstances ad-
ding political, ethical, historical, or structural considerations to the 
state constitutional discourse because we may feel unable to construct 
a coherent story about the meaning of the constitution that includes 
these elements. Again, these elements are generally missing from state 
constitutional discourse, and their absence can make state constitu-
tional interpretation seem like ordinary statutory construction. 
An objection might be raised at this point. Perhaps, it might be 
said, the seemingly frivolous nature of some state constitutional provi-
sions and the frequency with which state constitutions are amended 
merely suggest that we are looking for the wrong kind of constitu-
tional meaning. Of course it is ludicrous to suggest that a provision 
governing the width of ski trails reflects a fundamental value of the 
people of New York. It is far more likely that such a provision is 
256. Sturm, supra note 69, at 75-76. 
257. See ALA. CoNST. (Michie 1991). 
258. Sturm, supra note 69, at 78-79. 
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merely the result of a political compromise, perhaps among environ-
mentalists and development interest groups, and it should be treated 
as such. It is accordingly a mistake to invest the provision with any 
more portentous meaning. 
If such provisions are merely political compromises - and that 
certainly seems like a plausible explanation - they pose no less a 
threat to our notions of constitutionalism than does the idea that the 
people are incompetent. According to the conventions of constitution-
alism, a constitution is not supposed to be the outcome of pluralistic 
political bargaining on matters of everyday concern; that is the role 
played in our system by statutory law. Rather, constitutionalism as-
sumes that a constitution is the consensual act of a united society; it is 
viewed as the outcome of a process of deliberation meant to identify 
matters of fundamental importance to the people and to place those 
matters in a constitution specifically to protect them from the quotid-
ian predations of pluralistic power struggles. 259 
To the extent that a constitution or a particular provision departs 
so far from this model that it cannot plausibly be viewed as anything 
other than the result of pluralistic logrolling, constitutional discourse 
is correspondingly impoverished. One cannot plausibly claim a mean-
ing rooted in political theory, or justice, or the framers' deliberations 
on fundamental principles, for a constitutional provision that can only 
be explained as the result of a political deal among interest groups. Of 
course, it is not necessarily impossible to create a rich story about a 
constitutional provision just because it resulted from compromise. 
Our federal constitutional tradition has done just that by elevating 
some of the overt compromises appearing in the federal Constitution 
to near-mythical status, such as the Great Compromise that created 
popular representation in the House and representation by state in the 
Senate - a compromise viewed as so historically significant that we 
have named and capitalized it.260 But the basis of legislative represen-
tation is still very different from the taxation of golf courses or the 
width of ski trails, and it somehow seems improbable that a similar 
myth could emerge about a constitutional provision such as Califor-
nia's or New York's. 
Robert Cover once wrote: "No set oflegal institutions or prescrip-
tions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning. 
259. See supra notes 228-36 and accompanying text. 
260. Another compromise prevented regulation of the slave trade until 1808, U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 9, cl. 1. This feature of the Constitution plays a prominent role in the story of the Civil 
War and the subsequent Reconstruction Amendments. 
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For every constitution there is an epic .... "261 Yet state constitutions 
are hard-pressed to generate epics to give them meaning. When we 
tum upon state constitutions the narrative devices we use to create 
constitutional meaning on the federal level, we find state constitutions 
wanting. The stories to which they lend themselves are not stories of 
principle and integrity, but stories of expediency and compromise at 
best, foolishness and inconstancy at worst. And the poverty of state 
constitutional discourse merely reflects the limited narrative possibili-
ties that state constitutions offer to erstwhile interpreters.262 
But if this description is accurate, it reveals yet another contradic-
tion. We cannot seriously be willing to accept the conclusion that the 
people of the states are incapable of competent constitutional self-gov-
ernment. In fact, we know such a proposition to be false because 
every state citizen is also a citizen of the United States, and therefore, 
politically speaking, an author of the U.S. Constitution. Yet the U.S. 
Constitution is not only a vehicle of competent constitutional self-gov-
ernment, but a model emulated throughout the nation and the world. 
As noted earlier, it is the focus of an extraordinarily rich constitutional 
discourse - one providing the material for a true epic - that allows 
U.S. citizens to debate the meaning of the Constitution and, by so do-
ing, to debate their own identity.263 By taking seriously the premises 
of state constitutionalism, we seem driven to the position that the peo-
ple of the United States are simultaneously both competent and in-
competent practitioners of constitutional self-government. 
What can explain these contradictions? The next section argues 
that the divergence between the pedestrian reality of state constitu-
tions and the grand predictions of state constitutionalism can be ex-
plained in part by two factors: the incompatibility of state and federal 
constitutionalism, and American society's choice to adopt a national 
rather than a state identity. 
261. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Na"ative, 91 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983). 
262. Even Hans Linde himself, one of the guiding forces behind New Federalism, has recog· 
nized this aspect of state constitutional law. State constitutions, he has written, "demystify con· 
stitutional law. . . . They have drafters, yes, but no 'Founders'; no Federalist Papers; no 
equivalence of constitution and nationhood; no singularity[;] ..• no sanctified judges; certainly 
no claim as a 'civil religion' or as the perfect embodiment of justice, when there are forty-nine 
others." Linde, supra note 5, at 197 (footnote omitted). Linde goes on to ask why, if a constitu· 
tion does not enshrine "strongly held values,'' we ought to respect it. Id. at 198. His answer 
simply falls back on convention: "Any student of state constitutions knows that some of their 
provisions deserve very little respect, but they are nonetheless the law .•.• " Id. 
263. See supra notes 19·24 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Incompatibility of State and Federal Constitutionalism 
1. The Framework of Nationhood 
823 
Certainly one of the foundational and indispensable beliefs of 
American political and social life is that we are a nation, which is to 
say that we constitute collectively a certain community. To have a 
sense of community sufficient to sustain such a belief is to have, as 
Robert Burt has pointed out, "an acknowledged common identity" 
capable of transcending disputes and differences that arise among 
us.264 Under what conditions can such a common identity exist? Ac-
cording to James Boyd White, a community is, on the most basic level, 
"a group of people who tell a shared story in a shared language."265 
On this view, discourse is a critical element of the communal relation-
ship: The "community talks itself into an historical identity."266 
One way discourse accomplishes this task is by revealing and 
maintaining the common values of the members of the community.267 
The existence of such values is a necessary condition for the emer-
gence of a community; as Kenneth Karst has put it, American na-
tionhood rests on a shared culture, national in scope, consisting of, at 
minimum, "a set of universal norms."268 Moreover, such a commu-
nity cannot be forced into existence or declared to exist by fiat;269 it 
can arise "only as a by-product of the shared pursuit of more tangible 
goals and activities."210 
For Americans, discourse, values, and activities all intersect in the 
U.S. Constitution: it is a text, and thus a form of discourse; its subject 
matter is the values of society; and it is used in a real way as part of the 
activity of self-governance. As a result, the Constitution performs a 
highly important function in not only symbolizing American na-
tionhood, but in constituting it as well. 271 It serves as a focal point for 
the creation and perpetuation of a plausible narrative identity for the 
264. Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 
456 (1984). 
265. WHITE, HERACLES, supra note 14, at 172. 
266. Kahn, supra note 20, at 3. 
267. Id. 
268. KENNETH L. KARsT, BELONGING IN AMERICA 28-31, 31 (1989). 
269. See Burt, supra note 264, at 486; cf. Milner S. Ball, Stories of Olfgin and Constitutional 
Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2280, 2315 (1989) (arguing ideas cannot transform the popular 
will). 
270. KARST, supra note 268, at 180 (quoting DENNIS H. WRONG, SKEPTICAL SOCIOLOGY 79 
(1976)). 
271. KARST, supra note 268, at 177; WHITE, HERACLES, supra note 14, at 41; see also KAM-
MEN, MACHINE, supra note 17, at 68-94; Note, Amendomania, supra note 26, at 281 (noting that 
California Constitution is "totally unfit to be a popular ideological rallying point or symbol"). 
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national community and its individual members.272 
But if the Constitution helps create and define a national identity, 
it also helps to set limits - both for the community and for its individ-
ual members - on what that identity can be.273 If we as a nation are a 
community that holds certain values, then it becomes difficult for 
those who consider themselves to be members of the community to 
hold different or incompatible values and to act on them. Suppose, for 
example, that the Constitution embodies "a fundamental value deter-
mination of our [national] society that it is far worse to convict an 
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free. "274 If so, society would 
be extremely hard-pressed to tolerate behavior by individuals or sub-
groups based on the notion that the goal of pursuing the guilty justifies 
inadvertently harming the innocent. If we are a people who value jus-
tice, one might say, can we also be a people who value expediency? 
It is in this sense of constraining identity - what Robert Cover 
called the ''jurispathic" function of law275 - that the existence in our 
system of state constitutions is in tension with the premises of national 
constitutionalism and may even pose a genuine threat to it. Our con-
stitutional language and culture hold the U.S. Constitution to be the 
repository of the fundamental values of the national community, a 
community to which every citizen belongs. When we apply the same 
conventions to state constitutions, we are led of course to the same 
conclusion: state constitutions are also the repository of fundamental 
values, but the values are those of the peoples of the individual states. 
This arrangement is workable, although seemingly redundant, as 
long as the state and federal constitutions are congruent. But if they 
differ, the conventions of constitutionalism compel the conclusion that 
the values embodied in the state constitution are fundamental to the 
people of the state but not to the people of the nation, and vice versa. 
This, too, would be untroubling were it not for the fact that the mem-
bers of the state community are also members of the national commu-
nity. Thus, when a state constitution conflicts with the national 
Constitution, we can only conclude that the people of that state con-
sider certain values fundamental for themselves, but not for the rest of 
us. 
Even on the most basic level, this type of divergence can be unset-
tling. If a value is good enough to be fundamental to the people of the 
272. See Ball, supra note 269, at 2282-87 (discussing the American story of national origin). 
273. See Kahn, supra note 20, at 5 ("Individual identity does not exist apart from the dis-
course that creates and sustains the community."). 
274. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
275. Cover, supra note 261, at 41-42. 
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state, one might say, why isn't it good enough for everybody? There is 
something vaguely selfish and hostile about the people of a state going 
off to their own comer and making up rules for their own self-govern-
ance that they think superior to the ones the rest of the country has 
decided to use. And even were this not the case, it is difficult to accept 
the idea that fundamental values on which all Americans agree can 
really differ significantly from place to place. Can the elements of ba-
sic human dignity, for example, really mean something very different 
to the inhabitants of Ohio and Indiana?276 
More importantly, though, discrepancies between the state and 
federal constitutions can also be viewed as unintelligible inconsisten-
cies - the same individuals, it seems, have given two different, and 
possibly incompatible, accotlnts of the values they hold fundamental. 
For example, the national community holds the imposition of cruel 
punishments to be morally wrong;277 this belief defines a people whose 
character is such that they recoil at the idea of using torture for any 
purpose, no matter how worthy the goal. Suppose the people of a state 
adopt a constitution lacking such a provision, or repeal a similar pro-
vision in the present state constitution. Can we then say that such a 
decision reveals a character that is untroubled by the use of torture? 
Such an inference embraces another contradiction: how can the same 
person simultaneously have both types of character? Constitutional-
ism itself rejects such a possibility - if a constitution reflects the char-
acter of a people then it cannot simultaneously reflect the opposite of 
their character.21s 
Furthermore, attempting to salvage the character principle as an 
explanation for constitutional differences tends to reduce the concept 
of character to triviality. Consider a fairly common instance in which 
a state's constitutional law may differ from federal constitutional law 
or from the constitutional law of other states. Until 1983, the U.S. 
Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to preclude the 
issuance of a search warrant on the tip of an anonymous informant 
276. Cf. Project Report, supra note 25, at 277 ("If a coerced confession was repugnant to 
human dignity why should it matter which government happened to be exacting it?"). 
277. See U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII. 
278. A dedicated postmodernist might say that I have done nothing more here than describe 
the postmodern condition - this is simply how we live our lives, participating in many inconsis-
tent activities and discourses, and that is just the way it is. The postmodern outlook thus deals 
with such contradictions not by resolving them but by accepting them as inevitable. For an 
interesting response to this view, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RA-
TIONALITY? (1988). In any event, the postmodernist answer does not help here; as a participant 
in the discourse, a court is obliged to avoid inconsistencies, or at least the appearance of inconsis-
tency. To embrace inconsistency would be to appear to abandon the ideal of the rule of law, an 
act that could have seriously destabilizing ramifications for society. 
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unless the warrant application satisfied a two-part test designed to as-
sess the informant's veracity and the basis of the informant's knowl-
edge - the so-called Aguilar-Spinelli test. 219 In Illinois v. Gates, 280 the 
Court abandoned the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test and adopted the 
so-called "totality of the circumstances" test, a standard more 
favorable to the state. Inevitably, numerous states were asked to apply 
parallel provisions of their state constitutions to cases like Gates. 
Prosecutors of course argued that the state provisions called for the 
totality of the circumstances test, and defendants argued that the ear-
lier Aguilar-Spinelli standard better captured the state's constitutional 
standards. Several states reached this issue as a matter ef state consti-
tutional law; some adopted the Gates test and others rejected it.281 
Leaving to one side the contradictions pointed out above, it is sim-
ply implausible that these different constitutional doctrines can be at-
tributed to differences in the fundamental character and values of the 
people of the states. What possible trait of character could cause 
someone to prefer a "totality of the circumstances" test for issuing a 
search warrant to a two-prong informant reliability test? To say that 
"we are a people who use the totality of the circumstances test" is to 
speak gibberish; it is like saying "we are a people who eat our stew 
with a fork instead of a spoon." Such preferences undoubtedly exist, 
but they cannot plausibly be traced to any fundamental value or char-
acter trait. 
Of course, on some level every difference in personal preference or 
behavior must be traceable to some personal trait that differs from the 
traits of others who behave differently in similar circumstances; if that 
were not the case then everyone would reason and behave identically. 
But to call all such variations differences of character would be to re-
duce the concept of character to triviality: it would account for every-
thing, and thus nothing. 
2. The Dangers of a Robust State Constitutionalism 
At this point, the following objection might be raised. These con-
tradictions and implausibilities are interesting, it might be said, but 
suppose that the people of a state just do really happen to have a char-
acter that differs from the people of other states or of the nation. Sup-
279. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-19 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 
108, 113-15 (1964). 
280. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
281. Compare State v. Arrington, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260-61 (N.C. 1984) (adopting Gates) and 
State v. Walter, 670 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Kan. 1983) (same) with State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 143 
(Wash. 1984) (rejecting Gates) and State v. Kimbro, 496 A.2d 498, 507-08 (Conn. 1985) (same) 
and Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 556 (Mass. 1985) (same). 
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pose it happens that the inhabitants of a state disagree collectively 
with enough aspects of the national Constitution, or disagree so vehe-
mently with a single aspect of the Constitution, that these disagree-
ments can only be understood as reflecting actual differences in 
character between the people of the state and the people of the nation. 
Wouldn't their constitution, if it embodied these differences, then re-
flect fundamental differences of character in the way state constitu-
tionalism predicts? 
The answer of course is yes, by definition. However, while nothing 
makes such a development impossible as a factual matter, it would 
pose a problem of some seriousness and potential danger to the people 
of the state and of the nation and is thus an inference to be avoided if 
possible. Suppose, to return to the previous example, that a refusal to 
embrace the totality of the circumstances test somehow indicated a 
character fundamentally different from the character that people must 
possess in order to be members of the national community. If that 
were the case, then it is possible that the community would have to 
redefine and reorganize itself, perhaps by casting out the minority who 
no longer share the dominant national identity. The world stage today 
is filled with nations that are breaking apart, sometimes violently, ap-
parently due to the perception among subgroups that the national 
identity is not one in which they can participate - for example, 
Croats in Yugoslavia, Lithuanians in the former Soviet Union, 
Tibetans in China, Kurds in Iraq, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Sikhs in India, 
Quebecois in Canada. 
Indeed, the United States itself went through its bloodiest crisis, 
the Civil War, as the result of just such a domestic conflict over the 
shape of the national character. One's attitude toward slavery is some-
thing that can quite plausibly be viewed, and was viewed, as reflecting 
a fundamental aspect of character. Once those on each side of the 
slavery issue came to view those on the other side as having an identity 
incompatible with their own, the stage was set for secession and war. 
It can thus be dangerous for the people of a state to say too vehe-
mently and too often, "We are fundamentally different from the rest of 
the nation." To talk in that way may be to contribute to conditions 
making it difficult for the state to consider itself, and to remain, a part 
of the nation. This danger may well account at least in part for state 
courts' reluctance to make too much of constitutional differences. 
3. The National Focus on Fundamental Values 
If national and state constitutionalism are incompatible - if only 
one constitution at a time can ever truly and safely reflect the essential 
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character and fundamental values of a people - then one form may 
have to yield to the other. The vigor of federal constitutional dis-
course and the poverty of state constitutional discourse suggest 
strongly that this theoretical fault line has shifted in our society, and 
that national constitutionalism has prevailed over its state cousin. In 
other words, state constitutional variations simply cannot be under-
stood to reflect local variations in character and fundamental values. 
But is this really a justifiable conclusion? Isn't it true that 
Oregonians have roots in a frontier culture characterized by extreme 
individualism, and that Massachusetts society has its roots in Puritan-
ism and social homogenization? And aren't such differences properly 
viewed, notwithstanding any danger, as differences in character? I 
think not. The tension between state and national constitutionalism 
has been largely resolved in the modem day United States by the col-
lapse of meaningful state identity and the coalescence of a social con-
sensus that fundamental values in this country will be debated and 
resolved on a national level. Thus, regardless of whether such regional 
differences existed in the past, they no longer exist and we may for the 
most part disregard them as viable elements of state constitutional 
discourse. 
First, in the modem world, any serious variations in the character 
of the people of individual states must have an extremely short half-
life. The national Constitution guarantees a right to travel among the 
several states, 282 and the ease of mobility and the national structure of 
the economy all but guarantee quick dilution of any truly significant 
local traits.283 Indeed, with the help of modem communications tech-
nology such dilution can occur without anyone traveling at all. We all 
watch the same national news and the same prime-time television 
shows; we listen to the same music on the radio; we shop in malls with 
the same stores; we eat at the same chain restaurants. It is difficult to 
see how any truly fundamental character differences could stand up 
against such a cultural assault. 
Some might object that these recent developments are irrelevant to 
282. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969). 
283. Cf. Pollock, supra note 35, at 986 (arguing that the national economy and mobility 
reduce attention to distinct local traits). Perhaps the most dramatic example of this phenomenon 
is the popular overturning in Alaska ofRavin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). In that case, 
the court relied on the "individuality" and desire for "control over their own lifestyles" of Alas· 
kans to strike down a law criminalizing marijuana possession on state constitutional grounds. 
537 P.2d at 504. Fifteen years later, the people of the state overturned this decision by ballot 
initiative. The 1990 Elections: State by State, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at BB, B9; see also 
Richard Maver, Alaskans to Vote on Marijuana Use, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, at Al7, col. 1. 
This suggests that the Alaskan character of rugged individualism did not hold out for long 
against the nationwide hardening in attitudes against drug use. 
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the interpretation of state constitutions that predate such social 
changes. But even if one were inclined to accept the argument that 
contemporary attitudes are completely irrelevant to constitutional in-
terpretation,284 a view held in its strict form by virtually no one,285 the 
objection is still unavailing. Most states have adopted their current 
constitutions, or so significantly amended them, in comparatively re-
cent times that it is difficult to argue that the constitutions cannot be 
read to incorporate attitudes toward nation and state of relatively re-
cent vintage. 
Moreover, I think it is fair to say that at this stage in our national 
life, Americans tend to focus on and debate issues concerning funda-
mental values primarily on a national level. 286 In a recent poll, over 
half of those surveyed did not even know that their state had its own 
constitution.287 It is difficult to debate an identity expressed in a con-
stitution you do not know exists. Further, national interest and advo-
cacy groups seem to set the agenda of ethical and political issues that 
people consider fundamental, and to dominate the ensuing debate. 
And the national reach of even local media allows people to debate 
these issues with opponents from all parts of the country, not merely 
from their own state. The abortion debate illustrates this nicely. A 
great many people, even some who are well informed, labor under the 
misconception that if the Supreme Court overrules Roe v. Wade, abor-
tion will be illegal; it does not even occur to them that such a ruling 
would only shift the debate to state forums. 
So accustomed have Americans become to debating fundamental 
moral and policy issues on a national level that, paradoxically, state 
involvement in such issues can sometimes seem vaguely an-
tidemocratic. For example, you become active in a national issue 
group, attend rallies, write your congressional representatives, and 
otherwise slug it out with your opponents. Suppose your side wins. 
The democratic system has worked, and according to the rules of the 
284. Two leading exponents of this view are Raoul Berger and Robert Bork. See RAOUL 
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). 
285. Judge Vito Titone of the New York Court of Appeals has argued that a noninterpretive 
method of constitutional interpretation is more appropriate for state constitutions than for the 
federal Constitution because of the recency and ease of amendment of state documents. Titone, 
supra note 215, at 471. 
286. See Spaeth, supra note 31, at 736 ("[W]hen we think of our natural rights ... we think 
of rights protected by the federal Constitution, not by the constitution of the state where we 
happen to live."); Teachout, supra note 28, at 14 ("For most of our history the constitutional law 
that has been most important in shaping our culture has been a national constitutional law."). 
287. Robert F. Williams & Earl M. Maltz, Introduction, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 877, 878 n.4 
(1989) (citing John Kincaid, State Court Protections of Individual Rights Under State Constitu-
tions: The New Judicial Federalism, 61 J. STATE GOVT. 163, 169 (Sept./Oct. 1988)). 
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game your opponents must take their lumps and abide by the decision 
of the majority - the issue is settled. But when the state chapter of 
your group starts sending you urgent notices that your position is 
under attack on the state level, you may well feel betrayed; this battle 
has been won, and the other side should just go away. Trying to slide 
something by on the state level seems like poor sportsmanship, if not 
some kind of political dirty trick. 
Corresponding to the national focus of the debate on values is the 
general absence of public identification with the polity defined by the 
state. We have no trappings, no rituals, no conventions that could 
serve even to keep the state in our thoughts. How many people, for 
instance, own a state flag, or even know what it looks like? How often 
do governors make televised addresses to the people of the state? As 
Professor Karst has pointed out, "Before the small-town basketball 
game begins, the high school band plays 'The Star-Spangled 
Banner.' " 288 
D. The Nature of State Constitutional Differences 
We have seen that attributing differences among the various state 
and federal constitutions to variations in the character of the relevant 
polities is contradictory, counterfactual, and potentially dangerous. 
Yet state constitutions do differ, and those differences can have signifi-
cant legal effects. If constitutional differences do not result from local 
variations in the character and values of the people, how can we ac-
count for them and what interpretation should we give them? The 
answer, I suggest, lies in treating character itself as a more complex 
phenomenon than proponents of New Federalism are wont to do. 
Consider our notion of dissent. Many constitutional decisions of 
the U.S. Supreme Court are not unanimous; different Justices have 
different views about how the Constitution applies in particular cir-
cumstances, which occasionally leads them to dissent. Yet we do not 
consider a divided Supreme Court opinion to impugn in the least our 
belief in the reality of our nationhood, nor do we attribute such differ-
ences in opinion among the Justices to particularized personal attrib-
utes that rise to the level of ontological significance. Indeed, to 
attribute a dissent to a truly fundamental difference of character be-
tween the dissenters and the majority would be to question the extent 
to which the dissenters can really be a part of the national community 
- it would be, in essence, to question whether they are real Ameri-
cans. Of course, questioning the Americanism of those with whom we 
288. KARST, supra note 268, at 180. 
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disagree is unfortunately an all too commonly employed rhetorical de-
vice. But responsible people avoid such accusations because of the 
danger they pose to the stability and coherence of the national com-
munity - we have no real wish to become a people who cast out those 
who disagree with the majority. 
The idea of dissenting opinions furnishes a useful model for think-
ing about state constitutional variations. A dissenter in a constitu-
tional case is one who disagrees with the majority about the meaning 
of the constitution, yet is nonetheless someone we can still consider to 
be a member of society - someone who shares our fundamental sense 
of identity and the values that help constitute that identity. 289 That 
dissenters can exist within a society without significantly disrupting it 
reveals an important aspect of communal identity: a community is not 
composed of unifopn individuals who share every attitude and value. 
Rather, society is textured in an irregular, clumpy way; some people 
embrace society's dominant values more firmly than others, or em-
brace certain values and not others, or hold idiosyncratic views about 
what behavior society's values require in certain situations. Yet all 
these people may nevertheless share essentially in the communal 
identity. 
Of course, there are limits to how far any individual can wander 
from the mean and still be a person capable of sharing in the commu-
nal identity. Those who roam beyond the tolerable boundaries of 
communal identity might be people so fundamentally different from 
the members of the community that we may justly describe them as 
having a different character. But it seems clear that the character of a 
workable national community must be sufficiently broad to embrace a 
great deal of individual variation. 
This notion of clumpy, irregular variations of a single national 
character offers a better model of state-to-state differences in the popu-
lace than does the notion of fundamental character variations from 
subgroup to subgroup. Taken together, the views of all members of 
the national community yield a certain national profile. But because 
of the irregularity of variations from the national mean, the views of 
any given subgroup of the community, such as the people of a state, 
might yield a profile somewhat different from the national one. This 
does not mean, however, that the people of the state possess a different 
character from the people of the nation; it means only that they pos-
289. See Burt, supra note 264, at 456 (stating that adjudication in a democracy depends on 
"an acknowledged common identity that transcends the divisive implications of the immediate 
dispute"). 
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sess the various elements of the national character in slightly different 
proportions than does the nation as a whole. 
On this view, differences among state constitutions and between 
the federal and state constitutions do not reflect the fundamentally dis-
tinct choices of fundamentally distinct groups; rather, they reflect the 
varied outcomes of constitutional bargaining among essentially similar 
subgroups distributed in slightly different proportions within each 
state. That is, the subsets of the populace defined by the states, when 
given the opportunity to draft their own constitutions, come up with 
documents that differ from the national one to the same extent that 
views represented on the national level are represented in different pro-
portions within the state. Of course, to take this view is to reject state 
constitutionalism as New Federalism conceives it; as explained earlier, 
the idea that state constitutions result from political bargaining and 
opportunism rather than deliberation and choice is an idea that con-
flicts with the premises of constitutionalism. 
VI. SOME POSSIBLE REsOLUTIONS 
If the assumptions and predictions of state constitutionalism do 
not mesh with the realities of national identity, is there any way to 
resolve this tension? How, in other words, should we treat state con-
stitutions if the assumptions of constitutionalism do not adequately 
describe them? In this Part, I touch briefly on three possible ways out 
of the current impasse. 
The first solution, and the one most consistent with the tenets of 
New Federalism, would be to revise state constitutions to make them 
the reflections of the fundamental values and character of the state 
polities that constitutionalism says they ought to be - to conform 
reality to theory. This would be a task of monumental proportions 
and probably quite impossible. It would require at a minimum the 
wholesale amendment of state constitutions to eliminate frivolous, 
overtly political, and excessively technical provisions that undermine 
the sense of seriousness that state constitutions convey. But even 
more; it would require a widespread reorientation of attitudes toward 
the state. It seems highly unlikely that state constitutions could plau-
sibly be refashioned into true reflections of the character of the people 
of th~ state so long as the people continue to identify so little with the 
community that the state polity theoretically defines. 
The only way out of this dilemma is to convince the people of the 
states that they really do constitute unique communities that differ in 
fundamental ways from the communities defined by neighboring states 
and by the nation. But it is doubtful that such an effort could succeed 
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at this point. Americans' identities have drifted so far from associa-
tion with the states and are so closely woven into a national identity 
that the trend seems all but irreversible. Moreover, it is not at all clear 
that reorienting attitudes in this way would be ultimately beneficial. 
Convincing the people of the states that they constitute unique com-
munities means convincing them that they differ from one another in 
significant ways. But convincing them that they are different makes 
them so - such a belief takes on a reality by its own force. Unfortu-
nately, fostering the cleavage of society in this way threatens the sta-
bility of the national community: if the people of a state embrace aµ 
identity that makes them different from the national community, they 
may view themselves as too different to remain part of the national 
community. As I suggested earlier, this path is potentially dangerous, 
and the threat to national stability posed by stressing differences at the 
expense of unity seems to· counsel against such an approach to state 
constitutionalism. 
If conforming reality to theory proves unworkable, a second ap-
proach might be to conform theory to reality by abandoning the 
strongest claims of state constitutionalism and recognizing that state 
constitutions simply do not and perhaps cannot reflect the fundamen-
tal values and character of distinct state polities. Such an approach 
might require, for example, that a state constitution be treated as a 
unique type of document without analogue in our universe of legal 
documents; a state constitution might thus be viewed as something less 
than a "real" constitution such as the U.S. Constitution, but some-
thing more than a statute. Perhaps state constitutional provisions 
might be viewed, like statutes, as outcomes of frankly pluralistic power 
struggles, but concerning subjects that the polity wants for some rea-
son to remove from the political agenda for some period of time. In-
deed, this seems to be the direction in which state supreme courts have 
moved; they are generally unwilling to invoke the grandest interpre-
tive strategies of constitutionalism, but are nevertheless forced to treat 
constitutional positive law as somehow different from ordinary statu-
tory law. This waffiing helps account for the unsettled and unsettling 
status of state constitutional discourse. 
The problem with such an approach, however, lies in justifying its 
place in a legal system dominated by the conventions of constitutional-
ism. We seem to lack conventions capable of explaining convincingly 
why state constitutions serve any particularly valuable function. Why, 
for example, would the people of a state want to elevate some political 
decision to constitutional status, thereby placing it beyond the easy 
reach of the legislature to alter, if the decision expressed in the provi-
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sion is not one. that the members of the polity consider particularly 
fundamental? Seen from the perspective of the· conventions of consti-
tutionalism, such a decision seems odd and perhaps inexplicable. 
These conventions tell us, for example, that fundamental things belong 
in a constitution and everything else should be a matter of statutory 
law. There is nothing wrong with resolving highly important social 
issues by statute, nor is a legislature ever forced to tinker with a polit-
ical compromise worked out in statutory form. The only reason a leg-
islature might want to disturb a .politically sensitive compromise 
would be some felt need to adjust it; and the materialization of such a 
need would only validate the initial decision to deal with the matter by 
statute, since the original solution could be easily reformulated by sub-
sequent legislation rather than by constitutional amendment. Indeed, 
the conventions of constitutionalism can make this type of state consti-
tutional law seem downright antidemocratic - a constitutional 
amendment becomes a cheap trick pulled by the legislative majority to 
elevate a temporary political victory to semipermanent status.290 
What this discussion shows, I think, is that we currently lack a set 
of conventions justifying an intermediate place for state constitutional 
law and guiding us in its use and interpretation. If we are to clarify 
the role of state constitutions enough to make them useful, we need to 
develop such conventions. It is quite possible, moreover, that no such 
conventions can be developed without amending the political theories 
offederalism and constitutionalism from which the extant conventions 
are derived. This in turn raises the possibility that the development of 
new conventions for the interpretation of state constitutions might 
threaten the conventions governing national constitutionalism. Rou-
tinely treating state constitutions as reflecting anything less than the 
fundamental values and character of the people of the state could 
gradually erode the respect - some say reverence - for constitutions 
that underlies the significant place of the federal Constitution in our 
political system.291 The threat of such loss of respect may well be 
what prevents state supreme courts from frankly abandoning the view 
that state constitutions express fundamental values,292 and leaves them 
floundering in the no-man's land of current state constitutional 
discourse. 
290. See Williams, supra note 34, at 175 (questioning whether state constitutions are "expres-
sions of what is thought to be the best structure of government and statement of people's rights," 
or "instruments oflawmaking through which interest groups ••• seek the grand prize oflawmak· 
ing, striving to achieve constitutional status for the policy they advocate"). 
291. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions in Historical Perspectfre, 496 AN· 
NALS 33, 35 (1988); KAMMEN, MACHINE, supra note 17; Linde, supra note 5, at 197. 
292. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
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A final way to resolve the conflicts between the theory and practice 
of state constitutionalism is sufficiently radical' that I will offer it here 
not as a serious proposal, but as a guidepost against which other solu-
tions can be judged. The resolution is this: if Americans really do not 
identify in any meaningful way with their state polities, perhaps the 
concept of statehood has outlived its usefulness and should be abol-
ished. We might therefore restructure our political institutions to cor-
respond to the communities with which we actually identify. With 
what communities do we identify? Clearly Americans identify 
strongly with a national community, and a vital role remains for a 
constitution national in scope. 
But what about identity on a more local level? While I believe that 
few Americans identify themselves with a community purporting to 
embrace an entire state, I think that most Americans identify them-
selves rather strongly with a coiµmunity embracing their hometown 
and the immediately surrounding area. The thought "we are a people 
who ... " seems to have far greater currency when applied to the peo-
ple of a local community or county than to the people of a state; it 
seems more plausible to claim that the people of a major metropolitan 
center have a different character from and hold different values than 
the people of a rural farming community, even when both communi-
ties are in the same state. Yet localities in our system have political 
control over comparatively few aspects of daily life.293 
Perhaps what needs to be done is to greatly reduce the role of the 
states in our political life by redistributing the bulk of state powers 
between the national government and some level of local government, 
such as the municipal or county level. this could potentially maintain 
the significant degree of local control over political decisions that state 
government offers, while at the same time adjusting,the level at which 
political power is exercised to correspond to the communities with 
which ordinary people actually identify. 
Of course, the actual distribution of powers between national and 
local government might make a tremendous difference in the worka-
bility of such a plan. In addition, it is always possible that a new vari-
ety of county or local constitutionalism could lead to a degree of 
balkanization even less compatible with nationhood than whatever 
threat a revitalized state constitutionalism might pose. On the other 
hand, such a redistribution, if it worked, could offer substantial social 
benefits; perhaps, for example, citizen participation in the political life 
of the community might increase if citizens identified more readily and 
293. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980). 
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personally with ~the government making the decisions that affected 
them. 
CONCLUSION 
Oscar Wilde once wrote: "There is only one thing in the world 
worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about. "294 
Wilde's observation has proved true for state constitutions - they are 
generally not talked about, but even when they are talked about the 
talk is usually garbled or unintelligible. I have argued in this article 
that the silence and uneasy confusion surrounding state constitutions 
results from our lack of a language in which to speak about them, our 
lack of a language in which we can comprehensibly debate their 
meaning. 
This is indeed a strange state of affairs. State constitutions seem 
like important artifacts of our legal system; they are uniformly viewed 
by participants in the legal system as authoritative sources of positive 
law that state governmental actors must unfailingly obey. How is it 
possible that we could lack a useful language in which to speak about 
such a prominent feature of the legal landscape? The truth, I suggest, 
is that this question is based on false premises. 
People develop the languages they need to develop. They do so 
when they require a language to help them accomplish some purpose 
or goal they have set for themselves. When speaking a language fails 
to accomplish a purpose thought to be worth accomplishing, there is 
no need to speak it and the language will either disappear or will fail to 
emerge in the first place. The absence of a language suitable for debat-
ing the meaning of state constitutions - a state constitutional dis-
course - thus suggests that society has no particular need for such a 
language; debating the meaning of a state constitution is not thought 
to be an activity particularly worth pursuing. How can this be? 
We understand a constitution to be a document that defines a com-
munity by identifying its members and by setting out many of their 
fundamental choices about the way they want to live their lives. A 
language that allows members of a community to debate the meaning 
of their constitution allows them to debate their own choices and val-
ues, and ultimately their own identity. For a community to lack a 
language in which to debate the meaning of its constitution can there-
fore mean only one of two things: either the community has no need 
to debate its identity, or the community that the constitution suppos-
edly defines does not really exist. Human nature itself precludes the 
294. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 2 (John Lane 1925). 
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first possibility; if discourse creates identity, then no community could 
exist for long without developing a need for a language in which to 
debate the nature of its identity.295 That leaves the second possibility 
- the communities in theory defined by state constitutions simply do 
not exist, and debating the meaning of a state constitution does not 
involve defining an identity that any group would recognize as its own. 
I have argued that this is indeed the case. Americans have a com-
munal identity, but it is a national and not a state identity. We debate 
our fundamental values and our identity through constitutional dis-
course, but we do so on a national level, as a national community. 
Residency in one state rather than another is not viewed as an aspect 
of individual or group identity, or if it is, it has come to represent 
aspects of identity that are not bound up with the types of decisions 
that make us who we are in any kind of essential way. As long as this 
continues to be the case, state constitutional law is likely to remain 
marginal to legal life, and future battles over the nature of the Ameri-
can character and communal identity will have to be fought, like their 
predecessors, on a national level in the forum of federal constitutional 
law. 
295. See WHITE, HERACLES, supra note 14, at 140 ("[T]elling stories about the world and 
claiming meanings for them" is "as universal and deeply rooted in human nature" as any "intel-
lectual activity" can be.). 
